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A FEMINIST ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE ON
CONTRACT LAW: PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AS
AN EXAMPLE
rit an*
Abstract
Economic analysis is a highly influential theoretical approach to
contract law. At the same time, feminist analysis of contract law
offers an important critical approach to the field. However, feminist economics, a prominent alternative approach to mainstream
neo-classical economics drawing from both economic theory and
feminist theory, has only been applied scarcely and sporadically to
contract law. This Article seeks to bridge this gap and to apply
the key features of feminist economics to an analysis of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. This Article uses promissory estoppel
as an example to demonstrate a feminist economic analysis of
contract law.
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Introduction
Economic analysis is a prominent theoretical approach to contract
1
law. At the same time, feminist analysis is an important critical ap2
proach to contract law. However, contract law scholars have paid only
1. For economic analysis of contract law, see STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 291 (2004); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 95 (9th ed. 2014); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW &
ECONOMICS 276 (6th ed. 2012); Benjamin E. Hermalin, Avery W. Katz & Richard
Craswell, Contract Law, in HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 7 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shvell eds., 2007).
2. Hila Keren, Feminism and Contract Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FEMINIST
JURISPRUDENCE 406 (Robin West & Cynthia Grant Bowman eds., 2019); Debora L.
Threedy, Dancing Around Gender: Lessons from Arthur Murray on Gender and Contracts, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 749 (2010) [hereinafter Threedy, Dancing Around
Gender]; Debora L. Threedy, Feminists and Contract Doctrine, 32 IND. L. REV. 1247
(1999); MARY JOE FRUG, POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM (1992); Patricia A. Tidwell
& Peter Linzer, The Flesh-Colored Band Aid: Contracts, Feminism, Dialogue, and
Norms, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 791 (1991); Lea S. VanderVelde, The Gendered Origins of
the Lumley Doctrine: Binding Men’s Consciences and Women’s Fidelity, 101 YALE L.J.
775 (1992); Amy J. Schmitz, Sex Matters: Considering Gender in Consumer Contracting, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 437 (2013); FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON
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scarce attention to feminist economics. This Article aims to fill this
void. The integration of both feminist theory and economics contributes to contract law analysis beyond the application of each theory
alone. Economic analysis of contract law infused with feminist insights
contributes to the development of contract law doctrines and core val4
ues.
Using promissory estoppel as an example, this Article argues that
feminist economic analysis enriches contract law. The theoretical insights of feminist economics are applicable to promissory estoppel as
well as to other doctrines such as unconscionability, good faith, interpretation, duress, and undue influence, as well as to core concepts, values, and principles of contract law such as autonomy, consent, and freedom of contract.
The doctrine of promissory estoppel has captured much scholarly
5
6
attention. Some scholars view promissory estoppel as an insignificant
and limited doctrine, a doctrine that is a mere substitute for the doctrine
of consideration or a secondary doctrine of contract formation that de7
viates from the basic principles of contract law. Other scholars view
promissory estoppel as an important doctrine serving important functions, such as: making contract formation broader and more flexible;
mitigating power imbalance between parties; strengthening the right to

3.

4.

5.
6.

7.

CONTRACT LAW (Linda Mulcahy & Sally Wheeler eds., 2005); Martha M. Ertman,
Legal Tenderness: Feminist Perspectives on Contract Law, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
545 (2006) (book review); Mary Joe Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis
of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1065 (1985).
For contract law scholarship from feminist economic perspectives, see, for example,
Gillian K. Hadfield, The Dilemma of Choice: A Feminist Perspective on the Limits of
Freedom of Contract, 33 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 337 (1995); Alice Belcher, A Feminist
Perspective on Contract Theories from Law and Economics, 8 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD.
29 (2000); Adi Ayal, The Economic and Feminist Approaches to Law: An Eternal Feud
or a Misunderstanding Among Friends?, 10 DEMOCRATIC CULTURE 11 (2005).
“Feminist economics is a field that includes both studies of gender roles in the economy from a liberatory perspective and critical work directed at biases in the economics discipline.” Julie A. Nelson, Feminist Economics, in THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 4512, 4512 (3d ed. 2018). For a detailed explanation of
feminist economics see infra Part II.
Orit Gan, Promissory Estoppel: A Call for a More Inclusive Contract Law, 16 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 47, 52 (2013).
See Jay M. Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARV. L. REV. 678,
680 (1984); Joseph D. Weinstein, Comment, Promissory Estoppel in Washington, 55
WASH. L. REV. 795, 796 (1980); Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the “New Consensus” on Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical and Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
580, 581 (1998).
See generally Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppel, 49
HASTINGS L.J. 1191 (1998).
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contract; and promoting values—such as trust, cooperation, fairness,
and justice.
This Article joins the latter scholars, arguing for the significance of
promissory estoppel from a feminist economic perspective. Specifically,
this Article shows how feminist economic analysis enriches and expands
8
classic economic analysis of promissory estoppel. According to feminist
economics, promissory estoppel expands contract law beyond the bar9
gain theory, thus adding to the debate regarding the relation between
10
the doctrine of consideration and the promissory estoppel doctrine. In
other words, a feminist economic analysis demonstrates how promissory
estoppel complements the doctrine of consideration.
11
Take, for example, Ricketts v. Scothorn. In this classic case, a
grandfather promised his granddaughter that he would financially support her so that she would not have to work. On the basis of this prom12
ise, the granddaughter quit her job. The grandfather indeed paid her
the promised allowance; however, when he died, the executor of his will
13
refused to continue paying the granddaughter. The court enforced the
grandfather’s promise, stating that “having intentionally influenced the
plaintiff to alter her position for the worse on the faith of the note being
paid when due, it would be grossly inequitable to permit the maker, or
his executor, to resist payment on the ground that the promise was giv14
en without consideration.”
15
This case demonstrates the importance of promissory estoppel.
Enforcing the promise expands contract law beyond the bargain theory
and beyond market transactions supported by consideration. Promissory
estoppel in this case stretches contract law to include intra-family relations. Likewise, this case broadens contract law beyond efficiency and

8. For economic analysis of promissory estoppel, see infra Part I.C.
9. For the bargain theory, see 3 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §
8.9 (Eric Mills Holmes ed., rev. ed. 1996); EDWARD ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 2.19 (3d ed. 2004).
10. For the relations between the doctrine of consideration and the promissory estoppel
doctrine, see P. S. ATIYAH, CONSIDERATION IN CONTRACTS: A FUNDAMENTAL
RESTATEMENT 45-61 (1971); P. S. Atiyah, Consideration and Estoppel: The Thawing
of the Ice, 38 MOD. L. REV. 65 (1975); P. S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 777 (1979); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Contracts and the Requirement of Consideration: Positing a Unified Normative Theory of Contracts, Inter Vivos and Testamentary Gift Transfers, 91 N.D. L. REV. 547 (2015).
11. Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898).
12. Ricketts, 77 N.W. at 366.
13. Ricketts, 77 N.W. at 366.
14. Ricketts, 77 N.W. at 367.
15. See infra Part III.H.
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utility maximization to incorporate promises motivated by love and caring for another family member. Furthermore, promissory estoppel
opens up contract law to the influences of social norms, in this case of a
certain lifestyle. Promissory estoppel reveals how contracts are situated
within a given social context, in this case social class. In addition, this
case shows that sometimes family members might have different interests and perspectives. Lastly, this case demonstrates the importance of
gifts and donations.
As the brief analysis of Ricketts above demonstrates, feminist economics is relevant to contract law generally. Feminist economics con16
tests dichotomies : The inclusion of intra-family promises in contract
law goes beyond commercial promises and thus refutes the familymarket binary; the enforcement of gifts made for love goes beyond utility maximization and thus refutes the economic-emotion binary; the inclusion of social norms and social context in contract analysis inherently
refutes the private-public binary. Feminist economics compels contract
law to take into account the social context, aspects, and effects of con17
tracts. Specifically, feminist economics sheds light on gender norms
and how the economy is affected by the social context of patriarchy, discrimination, and inequality. In other words, the dynamic between men
and women is itself an important economic factor. Feminist economics
renders promises between family members an integral part of contract
18
law. These are general contributions to contract law that go beyond
19
promissory estoppel.
This Article has four parts. After briefly explaining the doctrine of
promissory estoppel and Section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, Part I reviews the literature on this doctrine. First, it explores
the literature stressing the doctrine’s marginality, secondary place, and
limited, narrow scope. Then it explores the literature emphasizing its
importance, significance, and contribution to contract law. Part II briefly explains feminist economics and its core theoretical tenets and features. Based on the previous parts, Part III engages in a feminist economic analysis of promissory estoppel, contributing to the debate over
whether promissory estoppel is important by joining the scholars in Part
I who answer in the affirmative. Part IV goes beyond promissory estoppel and shows how feminist economics can enrich contract law general-

16. Feminist economics critiques dichotomies and hierarchies in contract law, such as
private-public and home-market. See infra Part IV.C.
17. See infra Part IV.D.
18. See infra Part IV.E.
19. Infra Part IV.
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ly. This concluding part demonstrates that feminist economics is a valuable theory: It is relevant not only to promissory estoppel but also to
other doctrines, core concepts, and values at the heart of contract law.
I. Promissory Estoppel
A. The Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel
Section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to
induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a
third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be
20
limited as justice requires.
Promissory estoppel has evolved as a mechanism to enforce non21
bargained-for, relied-upon promises. It is considered a secondary rule
of enforceable promises and is viewed as a narrow and limited substitute
22
for consideration. While some scholars view promissory estoppel as a

20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 90 (AM. L. INST. 1981). For promissory estoppel under the UCC see, for example, Michael Gibson, Promissory Estoppel, Article
2 of the U.C.C., and the Restatement (Third) of Contracts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 659
(1988); Michael T. Gibson, Reliance Damages in the Law of Sales Under Article 2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 909 (1997). For promissory estoppel
in civil law see, for example, David V. Snyder, Comparative Law in Action: Promissory
Estoppel, the Civil Law, and the Mixed Jurisdiction, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 695
(1998); Charles Calleros, Cause, Consideration, Promissory Estoppel, and Promises Under Deed: What Our Students Should Know About Enforcement of Promises in a Historical and International Context, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. 83 (2013).
21. For the historic origins of promissory estoppel see, for example, Eric Alden, Promissory Estoppel and the Origins of Contract Law, 9 NE. U. L. REV. 1 (2017); Joel M.
Ngugi, Promissory Estoppel: The Life History of an Ideal Legal Transplant, 41 U. RICH.
L. REV. 425 (2007); Kevin M. Teeven, A History of Promissory Estoppel: Growth in the
Face of Doctrinal Resistance, 72 TENN. L. REV. 1111 (2005). For the development of
promissory estoppel see Eric Mills Holmes, The Four Phases of Promissory Estoppel, 20
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 45 (1996).
22. See, e.g., Glitsos v. Kadish, 418 P.2d 129, 131 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966) (“The distinction, though narrow, is the difference between valid consideration on the one side,
and estoppel on the other, which, when the ends of justice so dictate, is a substitute
for consideration.”).
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contract law doctrine, according to other scholars, promissory estoppel
24
goes beyond contractual liability. Promissory estoppel is categorized as
a contract, tort, or equitable doctrine and classified, accordingly, as creating promise-based, assent-based, reliance-based, or equity-based liabil25
ity.
The law requires that four elements be present in order to invoke
26
the doctrine of promissory estoppel :
1) There has to be a clear, definite, and unambiguous promise;
2) The promisor must have had reason to expect reliance on
the promise;
3) The promise must have induced such reliance and a consequent detrimental change of position; and
4) Injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
27
promise.
28

Section 90 provides for a flexible remedy, “as justice requires.” Indeed,
29
some courts award reliance damages and other courts awarded expecta30
tion damages.

23. For the relation between promissory estoppel and the parol evidence rule see, for example, Michael B. Metzger, The Parol Evidence Rule: Promissory Estoppel’s Next Conquest?, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1383 (1983); David G. Epstein, Melinda Arbuckle & Kelly
Flanagan, Contract Law’s Two “P.E.’s”: Promissory Estoppel and the Parol Evidence
Rule, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 397 (2010). For the relation between promissory estoppel
and the statute of frauds see, for example, Stephen J. Leacock, Fingerprints of Equitable Estoppel and Promissory Estoppel on the Statute of Frauds in Contract Law, 2 WM. &
MARY BUS. L. REV. 73 (2011); David G. Epstein, Ryan D. Starbird & Joshua C.
Vincent, Reliance on Oral Promises: Statute of Frauds and “Promissory Estoppel,” 42
TEX. TECH L. REV. 913 (2010); Henry F. Luepke, III, Promissory Estoppel and the
Statute of Frauds in Missouri, 58 J. MO. B. 132 (2002).
24. Gan, supra note 5, at 56-64.
25. Id.
26. CORBIN, supra note 9, at § 8.9; FARNSWORTH, supra note 9, at § 2.19.
27. Orit Gan, The Justice Element of Promissory Estoppel, 89 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 55
(2015). See also Gerald Griffin Reidy, Note, Definite and Substantial Reliance: Remedying Injustice Under Section 90, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1217 (1998) (reviewing the
use of promissory estoppel to remedy injustice by enforcing relied-on promises).
28. Paul T. Wangerin, Damages for Reliance Across the Spectrum of Law: Of Blind Men
and Legal Elephants, 72 IOWA L. REV. 47, 49 (1986).
29. Warren A. Seavey, Reliance upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64 HARV. L.
REV. 913, 926 (1951).
30. See, e.g., Mary E. Becker, Promissory Estoppel Damages, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 131, 135
(1987) (“[C]ourts routinely award expectation damages unless those damages are too
speculative, indefinite, or otherwise unavailable under traditional contract rules.”);
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B. Promissory Estoppel Literature
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts adopted the bargain theory
31
and primarily enforces promises supported by consideration. However,
promissory estoppel provides an alternative basis for enforcement of
32
non-bargained-for relied-upon promises. Promissory estoppel has
evolved as a secondary rule of enforceable promises—a limited and narrow substitute for consideration. The main contract formation rule is
based on consideration, while promissory estoppel functions as a backup
33
rule for non-bargained-for promises. The literature on promissory estoppel is rich and diverse, taking different views on the relationship be34
tween the doctrine of consideration and promissory estoppel.
One view is that promissory estoppel is an insignificant and limited
doctrine, a mere substitute for the doctrine of consideration and a secondary doctrine of contract formation that deviates from contract law
35
principles. Contract law scholar Charles Knapp describes promissory
36
estoppel as “the new kid on the contracts block.” A related view stresses the difference between the doctrine of consideration and promissory

31.

32.
33.

34.

35.
36.

W. David Rankin, Concerning an Expectancy Based Remedial Theory of Promissory Estoppel, 69 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 116, 117 (2011) (“[N]umerous empirical and
jurisprudential studies confirm the judiciary’s proclivity toward treating gratuitous
promises as binding in certain circumstances, thereby protecting the expectation interest engendered by them.”); Adam Ship, The Primacy of Expectancy in Estoppel Remedies: An Historical and Empirical Analysis, 46 ALTA. L. REV. 77, 81 (2008) (“My conclusions disclose strong appellate judicial support in Canada, over the last 12 years,
for an expectation approach to estoppel.”).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 71 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“To constitute consideration, a performance or a return promise must be bargained for.”). For critique
of the doctrine of consideration see, for example, Hila Keren, Considering Affective
Consideration, 40 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 165 (2010); Alan M. White, Stop Teaching Consideration, 20 NEV. L.J. 503 (2020).
For the relation between the doctrine of consideration and the promissory estoppel
doctrine, see supra note 10.
See Eric Alden, Rethinking Promissory Estoppel, 16 NEV. L.J. 659, 661-64 (2016); Susan Lorde Martin, Kill the Monster: Promissory Estoppel as an Independent Cause of Action, 7 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1 (2016); Tory A. Weigand, Promissory Estoppel’s
Avoidance of Injustice and Measure of Damages: The Final Frontier, 23 SUFFOLK J.
TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 1 (2017).
Richard Michael Fischl, Ideology and Argument Construction in Contract Law, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY 283 (Emilios Christodoulidis,
Ruth Dukes & Marco Goldoni eds., 2019).
Feinman, supra note 6, at 680; Weinstein, supra note 6, at 796; Hillman, supra note
6, at 581.
Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppel, 49 HASTINGS
L.J. 1191, 1274 (1998).
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37

estoppel. Contract law scholar Grant Gilmore describes the relations
between consideration and reliance as the relation between “matter and
anti-matter,” “Restatement and anti-Restatement,” and “Contract and
38
anti-Contract.” Other scholars argue for a broad doctrine of considera39
tion, which would include promissory estoppel cases. According to an40
other view, promissory estoppel is not a contract doctrine, but rather a
41
42
tort or equity doctrine.
There is a body of scholarship that takes still another view of promissory estoppel. According to these scholars, promissory estoppel is not
43
44
insignificant, but rather broad and important. Scholars point to different reasons promissory estoppel is a significant doctrine of contract
formation.
First, promissory estoppel is a favorable addition to the bargain
45
theory. Some scholars support broadening the notion of contract lia-

37. Orvill C. Snyder, Promissory Estoppel in New York, 15 BROOK. L. REV. 27, 27-28
(1948).
38. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 61 (1974).
39. Bruce MacDougall, Consideration and Estoppel: Problem and Panacea, 15 DALHOUSIE
L.J. 265 (1992).
40. Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, The Emergence of Promissory Estoppel as an
Independent Theory of Recovery, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 472 (1983). But see Willard L.
Boyd III & Robert K. Huffman, The Treatment of Implied-in-Law and Implied-inFact Contracts and Promissory Estoppel in the United States Claims Court, 40 CATH. U.
L. REV. 605 (1991); Gary Shapiro, Note, C & K Engineering Contractors v. Amber
Steel Co.: Promissory Estoppel and the Right to Trial by Jury in California, 31
HASTINGS L.J. 697 (1980). For a relational approach, see, for example, Jay M. Feinman, The Last Promissory Estoppel Article, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 303 (1992).
41. Orvill C. Snyder, Promissory Estoppel as Tort, 35 IOWA L. REV. 28 (1949). See also
Jean Fleming Powers, Promissory Estoppel and Wagging the Dog, 59 ARK. L. REV. 841
(2007); Susan M. Morgan, A Comparative Analysis of the Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel in Australia, Great Britain and the United States, 15 MELB. U. L. REV. 134 (1985);
Andrew Robertson, Situating Equitable Estoppel Within the Law of Obligations, 19
SYDNEY L. REV. 32 (1997).
42. Eric Mills Holmes, Restatement of Promissory Estoppel, 32 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 263,
277-84 (1996). See also William R. Collins, Comment, The Enigma of Promissory Estoppel in New York, 48 ALB. L. REV. 822 (1984).
43. Marco J. Jimenez, The Many Faces of Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical Analysis Under
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 57 UCLA L. REV. 669 (2010). But see Phuong
N. Pham, Note, The Waning of Promissory Estoppel, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1263, 1270
(1994).
44. Wan Izatul Asma Wan Talaat, The Present Parameters of Promissory Estoppel and Its
Changing Role in the English, Australian and Malaysian Contract Law, 35 J.
MALAYSIAN & COMP. L. 39 (2008) (analyzing how courts broaden the doctrine of
promissory estoppel).
45. Gan, supra note 5, at 56.
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46

bility under the doctrine of consideration. Accordingly, contract formation is not limited by the bargain theory, and reliance is also a basis
for enforcing promises. Other scholars claim the enforcement of reliance-based promises makes contract law less individualistic, abstract,
47
and formalistic, and more flexible, contextual, and relational. Section
90 uses the open-ended term “reliance” and provides for a flexible rem48
edy—as justice requires. Promissory estoppel, then, relaxes the formal
rules of contract formation and provides that parties are estopped from
denying the contract.
Second, promissory estoppel complements the bargain theory by
49
addressing promises in non-bargain contexts. Some scholars claim that
promissory estoppel covers areas outside the scope of doctrine of consid50
eration. Promissory estoppel is an alternative to consideration, where
enforcement is based not only on free choice, but also on reliance, justice, and other public policies. Promissory estoppel complicates bargain
theory’s simplistic logic of free choice, according to which enforceability
51
of contract is based on the parties’ choice to be obligated. Enforcement
of promises under promissory estoppel is based on reliance as an alternative to the doctrine of consideration.

46. Randy E. Barnett, The Death of Reliance, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518, 522 (1996). See
also Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Is Reliance Still Dead?, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1
(2001). For Justice Cardozo’s broad doctrine of consideration that includes promissory estoppel promises, see Curtis Bridgeman, Allegheny College Revisited: Cardozo,
Consideration, and Formalism in Context, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 149 (2005); Joshua
P. Davis, Cardozo’s Judicial Craft and What Cases Come to Mean, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV.
777 (1993); Henry W. Humble, Promissory Estoppel in the Law of Contracts, 63 AM.
L. REV. 33 (1929); Mike Townsend, Cardozo’s Allegheny College Opinion: A Case
Study in Law as an Art, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 1103 (1996). For more broad notions of
consideration, see P. S. ATIYAH, ESSAYS ON CONTRACT 238 (1990); C.M.A.
McCauliff, A Historical Approach to the Contractual Ties That Bind Parties Together,
71 FORDHAM L. REV. 841, 864 (2002); Val D. Ricks, The Sophisticated Doctrine of
Consideration, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 99, 103-04 (2000).
47. See generally Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and the
Evolution of Contract Law, 18 AM. BUS. L.J. 139 (1980).
48. Carolyn Edwards, Promissory Estoppel and the Avoidance of Injustice, 12 OKLA. CITY
U. L. REV. 223 (1987).
49. Michael I. Swygert & Donald W. Smucker, Promissory Estoppel in Florida: Growing
Recognition of Promissory Obligation, 16 STETSON L. REV. 1 (1986); James Gordley,
Enforcing Promises, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 547, 548 (1995).
50. Feinman, supra note 6, at 680.
51. Gillian K. Hadfield, An Expressive Theory of Contract: From Feminist Dilemmas to a
Reconceptualization of Rational Choice in Contract Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1235
(1998).
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52

Third, promissory estoppel promotes efficiency. It encourages co53
operation, trust, and interdependence between the parties. This results
54
in reducing opportunistic and predatory behavior during negotiations.
In addition to promoting efficiency, promissory estoppel also promotes
the fairness of contracts. It is an equitable tool to achieve justice when
55
consideration is lacking or in the face of the misuse of formalities.
Fourth, promissory estoppel enables courts to mitigate the power
56
imbalance between parties and to monitor misuses of power. It reflects
a more paternalistic and protectionist contract law and greater intervention by the courts in contractual relations. For example, contract law
scholar Juliet Kostritsky argues that promissory estoppel facilitates contractual relations where a power imbalance, due to the respective status
57
or knowledge of the parties, could have prevented the transaction.
Lastly, promissory estoppel expands and strengthens the right to
58
contract. “Promissory estoppel enables promisees to overcome obstacles to meeting the formalities of the doctrine of consideration and to
59
contract nevertheless.” Thus, promissory estoppel plays an important
role in guaranteeing access to contract.
Feminist economics adds to this body of scholarship and highlights
the importance of care, non-market interactions, and the influence of
social norms (especially gender norms) on people’s choices and prefer60
ences. Feminist economics provides a fresh perspective and enriches
promissory estoppel scholarship. The feminist economic analysis in this
Article seeks to makes three primary contributions: First, based on this
analysis, it argues that promissory estoppel is a broad and important
doctrine and not an insignificant and secondary doctrine. Second, re52. For an economic analysis of promissory estoppel, see infra notes 61-73 and accompanying text.
53. Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and
the “Invisible Handshake,” 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 942 (1985); Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 823 (1941). See also John J. Chung,
Promissory Estoppel and the Protection of Interpersonal Trust, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 37
(2008); Jay M. Feinman, The Meaning of Reliance: A Historical Perspective, 1984 WIS.
L. REV. 1373, 1387 (1984).
54. Juliet P. Kostritsky, Uncertainty, Reliance, Preliminary Negotiations and the Holdup
Problem, 61 SMU L. REV. 1377 (2008).
55. Carolyn Edwards, Freedom of Contract and Fundamental Fairness for Individual Parties: The Tug of War Continues, 77 UMKC L. REV. 647 (2009).
56. Juliet P. Kostritsky, A New Theory of Assent-Based Liability Emerging Under the Guise
of Promissory Estoppel: An Explanation and Defense, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 895 (1987).
57. Id. at 911-13.
58. Gan, supra note 5.
59. Id. at 79.
60. See infra Part III.
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garding the relation between consideration and promissory estoppel,
this analysis argues that the latter doctrine is a valuable supplement to
the former. Third, this analysis challenges, expands, and enriches the
classic economic analysis of promissory estoppel, which will be discussed
in the next subpart. By adding a feminist perspective, this Article highlights the gender bias of mainstream economic analysis of promissory
estoppel.
C. Economic Analysis of Promissory Estoppel
According to mainstream law and economics, promises that benefit
61
both parties are enforceable. Courts enforce promises to promote efficient outcomes and refuse to enforce promises that fail to promote wel62
fare maximization. Thus, promissory estoppel, like consideration, is a
63
screening mechanism to enforce value enhancing promises. Promissory
estoppel promotes optimal interactions between promisee and promisor.
64
In other words, it makes both parties better off.
As contract law scholars Charles Goetz and Robert Scott explain,
“a promise may be enforceable to the extent that the promisee has incurred substantial costs, or conferred benefits, in reasonable reliance on
the promise. Promissory estoppel under Section 90 of the Restatement
of Contracts is the primary enforcement mechanism when action in re65
liance follows the promise.” Promissory estoppel promotes efficiency
by enforcing promises that caused costs to the promisee.
Law and economics scholar Richard Posner argues that a promise
“induce[s] reliance that cost[s] the promisee heavily when it [is] broken,
and such a cost can be avoided for the future by holding such a promi66
sor liable for the promisee’s cost of having relied.” The enforceability
of promises depends on whether imposing liability creates incentives for
67
future value maximizing conduct. In a promissory estoppel case, a
promise is enforceable to give parties incentives to behave efficiently.
That is, both to induce the promisor to be careful in making a promise
61. Juliet P. Kostritsky, The Rise and Fall of Promissory Estoppel or Is Promissory Estoppel
Really as Unsuccessful as Scholars Say It Is: A New Look at the Data, 37 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 531, 532-33 (2002).
62. See id. at 538 n.37.
63. Id. at 566-67.
64. Id.
65. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of
Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1262 (1980).
66. POSNER, supra note 1, at 101.
67. Id.
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and to take into account the cost that the promise has on the promisee,
68
as well as to induce the promisee to rely on the promise.
69
Another reason to enforce promises is to prevent opportunism.
Since the parties do not perform their duties under the contract simultaneously, the aim of contract law is to deter opportunistic behavior and
to prevent promisors from taking advantage of promisees by making
promises and then breaking them after reaping their benefits. Enforcing
a promise under promissory estoppel deters opportunistic behavior of
promisors by making them act upon their promises that the promisees
reasonably relied on.
An additional reason to enforce promises is to allocate risks efficiently between the parties. The question is: How would the parties
themselves have resolved the issue had they foreseen it? Should the
promisor assume the risk for the broken promise because she induced
reliance? Or should the promisee assume the risk since her reliance was
unreasonable? In the first instance the promise would be enforced and
in the second the promise would not be enforced. The question of
whether to enforce the promise also asks how to allocate the risk between the parties.
Furthermore, promissory estoppel is efficient since it protects the
70
promisee’s investment. Promissory estoppel encourages efficient precontractual investment by compensating for reliance during negotiations. Promissory estoppel polices opportunistic behavior by not allowing a promisor to benefit from the promisee’s reliance then deny the
promise and refrain from acting upon it. In such cases, the promise
would be enforceable, in order to promote the efficient reliance of the
promisee. Promissory estoppel promotes mutual trust, which also en71
hances mutual gains for both parties.
According to contract law scholar Richard Craswell:
The legal doctrines governing offer and acceptance can be interpreted to prevent one party from withdrawing in just those
cases where an enforceable commitment would have been

68. For Posner’s analysis of promissory estoppel, see Douglas G. Baird, Unlikely Resurrection: Richard Posner, Promissory Estoppel, and the Death of Contract, 86 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1037 (2019).
69. Kostritsky, supra note 61, at 567.
70. Rebecca Stone & Alexander Stremitzer, Promises, Reliance, and Psychological Lock-In
49 J. LEGAL STUD. 33, 34-35 (2020) (finding that, in addition to deterring underinvestment, promissory estoppel reduces overreliance and overinvestment in negotiations).
71. Kostritsky, supra note 61, at 567.
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necessary to induce an efficient level of reliance by the other
party. In those cases, I argue, even the party who now seeks
to withdraw would have wanted to be committed (if he or
she had been asked that question at the time the other party
72
had to rely), precisely in order to induce efficient reliance.
Promissory estoppel then protects efficient reliance, which contract law
scholar Avery Katz alludes to as well:
The efficiency of promissory estoppel in precontractual negotiations turns on the relative bargaining power of the parties
ex post. If offerors have the bargaining power, then holding
them responsible for lost reliance under the estoppel doctrine
promotes optimal reliance. If offerees have the bargaining
power, then optimal reliance requires them to bear the risk of
73
loss.
Economic analysis of promissory estoppel concentrates on market transactions and business negotiations. It also focuses on the parties and on
efficiency and utility maximization. Feminist economics provides an alternative economic analysis of promissory estoppel, looking beyond the
parties to social norms (especially gender norms), and focusing instead
on non-market agreements: activities such as caring, relations between
household members, and intra-family agreements. Feminist economics
acknowledges motivations beyond gain enhancement. Before delving
into a feminist economic analysis of promissory estoppel, the next Part
explains the theoretical foundations of feminist economics.
II. Feminist Economics
Feminist economics is a critical approach to mainstream neoliberal
74
economics. It exposes the gendered aspects, biases, dimensions, and
72. Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REV. 481, 484
(1996) (exploring efficient reliance as an implicit economic rationale underlying
courts’ decisions in contract formation cases).
73. Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick?: The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249, 1277 (1996). See also Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Omri Ben-Shahar, Precontractual Reliance, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 423, 430-39
(2001).
74. For feminist economics generally, see BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN: FEMINIST THEORY
AND ECONOMICS (Marianne A. Ferber & Julie A. Nelson eds., 1993); FEMINIST
ECONOMICS TODAY BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN (Marianne A. Ferber & Julie A. Nel-
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75

implications of the economy. While mainstream economics maintains
that gender is irrelevant, feminist economics suggests that gender rela76
tions are an important part of the economy. Feminist economics exists
in the intersection of economic theory and feminist theory, drawing
from both of these worlds. It also combines economic and feminist
methods and insights. Feminist economics is diverse, drawing from different schools within economics and from different schools within feminism. It is not the case that feminist economics is economics for women while mainstream economics is economics for men. Rather, feminist
economics is inclusive economics that goes beyond androcentric mainstream economics.
By the 1990s, feminist economics had become widely recognized as
77
an established subfield within economics. To date, there is rich scholarship in this field. For example, Feminist Economics was founded in the

son eds., 2003); Irene van Staveren, Feminist Economics: Setting Out the Parameters, in
GENDER AND ECONOMICS 18 (Christine Bauhardt & Gülay Caglar eds., 2010);
FEMINIST ECONOMICS (Drucilla Barker & Edith Kuiper eds., 2010); MUKESH
ESWARAN, WHY GENDER MATTERS IN ECONOMICS (2014); JOYCE P. JACOBSEN, THE
ECONOMICS OF GENDER (3d ed., 2007); COUNTING ON MARILYN WARING: NEW
ADVANCES IN FEMINIST ECONOMICS (Bjørnholt, Margunn & Ailsa McKay eds., 2d
ed., 2014); FRONTIERS IN THE ECONOMICS OF GENDER, (Francesca Bettio & Alina
Verashchagina eds., 2008); INTRODUCING RACE AND GENDER INTO ECONOMICS
(Robin L. Bartlett ed., 1997); MICHÈLE A. PUJOL, FEMINISM AND ANTI-FEMINISM IN
EARLY ECONOMIC THOUGHT (1992); OUT OF THE MARGIN: FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES ON ECONOMICS (Susan Feiner et al., eds., 1995); MARILYN WARING,
IF WOMEN COUNTED: A NEW FEMINIST ECONOMICS (1988); THE ELGAR
COMPANION TO FEMINIST ECONOMICS (Janice Peterson & Margaret Lewis eds.,
1999); TOWARD A FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS (Drucilla K. Barker &
Edith Kuiper eds., 2003); Ann Mari May, The Feminist Challenge to Economics, 45
CHALLENGE 45 (2002).
For feminist critique of law and economics, see, for example, Gillian K. Hadfield, Feminism, Fairness, and Welfare: An Invitation to Feminist Law and Economics, 1
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCIENCE 283 (2005); Gillian K. Hadfield, Households at Work:
Beyond Labor Market Policies to Remedy the Gender Gap, 82 GEO. L.J. 89 (1993);
Gillian K. Hadfield, A Coordination Model of the Sexual Division of Labor, 40 J. ECO.
BEHAV. & ORG. 125 (1999); FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS: GENDER,
LAW AND SOCIETY (Martha Albertson Fineman & Terence Dougherty eds., 2005);
LAW AND ECONOMICS: ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC APPROACHES TO LEGAL AND
REGULATORY ISSUES (Margaret Oppenheimer & Nicholas Mercuro eds., 2005).
75. Susan Himmelweit, Feminist Economics: Why All Economists Should Be Feminist Economists, in RETHINKING ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PLURALIST ECONOMICS
60, 61 (Liliann Fischer et al. eds., 2017).
76. Id. at 61.
77. Daniele Meulders, Feminist Economics, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL STUDIES SCIENCES 5451, 5451 (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B.
Baltes eds., 2001).
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mid 1990s and is by now a prestigious journal. As economics scholar
Cahal Moran notes:
Feminist economics is a key component of the movement for
pluralism in economics and one that has, to some extent,
been acknowledged by the mainstream of the profession. It
seeks to highlight issues which affect women because (it
claims) they have not traditionally been recognized in a field
78
dominated by men.
Two major themes of feminist economics are unpaid labor, mostly done
79
by women, and discrimination women face in the economy.
80
Like other schools of heterodox economics, feminist economics
challenges mainstream neoclassical economics. Though mainstream
81
economics itself has evolved over the years, its male bias is still acute.
Feminist economics thus challenges the foundation of mainstream eco82
nomics in the following ways.
A. Care Work
Mainstream economics either ignores care work or analyzes care
work as a commodity. Feminist economics highlights the differences be83
84
tween care work and the production and manufacture of goods. For
example, care work involves a personal relationship between the care
worker and the person cared for. Care work is also influenced by social
85
norms. Thus, feminist economics critiques mainstream economics for
measuring productivity, supply, and demand of care work like any other
commodity. Feminist economics goes beyond paid work and produc-

78. Cahal Moran, Why Feminist Economics Is Necessary, EXPLORING ECONOMICS:
RETHINKING ECONOMICS (2020), https://www.exploring-economics.org/en/discover
/Why-feministeconomics-is-necessary/ [https://perma.cc/72VU-AV4J].
79. Id.
80. David Dequech, Neoclassical, Mainstream, Orthodox, and Heterodox Economics, 30 J.
POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 279 (2007).
81. Himmelweit, supra note 75, at 62.
82. Id.
83. Care work is the hands-on services that children and some adults (like elderly or disabled individuals) require. These services are tailored specifically to individuals’ needs,
and involve tasks that others—who do not require care—can do by themselves. Care
work can be both paid and unpaid.
84. Himmelweit, supra note 75, at 69.
85. See infra Part II.E.
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tion and, unlike mainstream economics, focuses on care work. Care
work is mostly done by women, which results in inequalities in both
87
employment and the family. Thus, care work is gendered. Feminist
economics asks questions such as: Who does the care work? (Private
market entities? Public state entities? Family members? The community?
Immigrant workers?) For whom and under what conditions? (How
much are care workers paid?) What is good care work? How to measure
the quality of care work? The analysis of care work found in feminist
economics is relevant and applicable to housework and other types of
88
unpaid work. Feminist economics exposes the gendered nature of care
work and housework and highlights their importance to the economy.
B. Non-Market
Some mainstream economics theories ignore non-market activi89
90
ties. For example, the GDP does not count domestic work. Other
mainstream economic theories apply the same economic rules and as91
sumptions to non-market activities. As people interact in different
manners, feminist economics goes beyond the market to include families and communities. Feminist economics then questions who participates in the market? On what terms? Who has non-market obligations,
such as housework and care work? Feminist economics claims that
housework, which is most often women’s work, is part of the econo92
my. While men also engage in such non-market activities, the fact is
93
that they remain primarily carried out by women, which underscores
the gendered bias of classical economics’ limited view of accounting on86. Nancy Folbre, Measuring Care: Gender, Empowerment, and the Care Economy, 7 J.
HUM. DEV. 183 (2006); Helen Mussell, Who Dares to Care? (In the World of Finance),
24 FEMINIST ECON. 113 (2018); Rachel Connelly, Xiao-yuan Dong, Joyce Jacobsen
& Yaohui Zhao, The Care Economy in Post-Reform China: Feminist Research on Unpaid and Paid Work and Well-Being, 24 FEMINIST ECON. 1 (2018).
87. Nancy Folbre, The Care Penalty and Gender Inequality, in OXFORD HANDBOOK
WOMEN & ECONOMICS 749 (Susan L. Averett et al. eds., 2017).
88. Himmelweit, supra note 75, at 61-72.
89. Non-market activities include, for example, domestic work and housework (such as
cleaning, cooking, and caring for children).
90. Himmelweit, supra note 75, at 64.
91. GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE OF THE FAMILY 3-4 (1991); RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX
AND REASON 85 (1992).
92. KATRINE MARÇAL, WHO COOKED ADAM SMITH’S DINNER? (Saskia Vogel trans.,
2016); Gabrielle Meagher & Julie A. Nelson, Survey Article: Feminism in the Dismal
Science, 12 J. POL. PHIL. 102 (2004).
93. See Himmelweit, supra note 75, at 63.
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ly for the market. Moreover, the market and the home are interrelated.
For example, housework obligations leave less time for employment or
engagement in other market activities.
Though some mainstream economics theories address non-market
94
activities, feminist economics points specifically to the gendered nature
of these activities and to their importance to the economy.
C. Economic Man
95

Mainstream economics holds the assumption of the individual
economic man who is a selfish and rational utility maximizer as its mod96
el. Though subject to heavy critique, this model remains influential in
97
economic analysis. This model is a reflection of hegemonic privileged
men and excludes other men and women. Holding that people are not
self-centered but rather interdependent, feminist economics goes be98
yond the model of the economic man. It presents a fuller and richer
99
model of both men’s and women’s interactions and autonomy. It suggests that human beings are complex and not solely influenced by mate100
rial factors. People are more than just rational individuals. We cooperate. We are interdependent. We are part of a community or society.
Our behavior is a response to both nonmaterial and material incentives.
Feminist economics challenges the gendered bias of the economic man
model and offers an alternative: a holistic vision of the economic actor,
motivated by a variety of factors, and behaving in different forms and
101
not only according to one model.
D. Household Members
While mainstream economics focuses on the household as a unit,
feminist economics focuses on each family member and their different

94. See BECKER, supra note 91; POSNER, supra note 91.
95. See generally Dequech, supra note 80, at 281-92.
96. Ulla Grapard, Robinson Crusoe: The Quintessential Economic Man?, in ROBINSON
CRUSOE’S ECONOMIC MAN: A CONSTRUCTION AND DECONSTRUCTION 93 (Ulla
Grapard & Gillian Hewitson eds., 2011).
97. Id. at 93-99.
98. Himmelweit, supra note 75, at 63.
99. See Stephanie Seguino, Thomas Stevens & Mark A. Lutz, Gender and Cooperative
Behavior: Economic Man Rides Alone, 2 FEMINIST ECON. 1, 8 (1996).
100. Id.
101. Id.
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102

interests or preferences. These two views of the household are poignantly divergent; for example, individual income taxes (taxing individuals) are different from family income taxes (taxing the family unit rather
than individuals), and the former usually benefit women more than the
103
latter. Feminist economics looks at the different gender roles women
and men have in the family and the way resources are shared unequally
104
in the household. Rather than a simplistic view, feminist economics
105
suggests a more complex view of the household. Feminist economics
exposes the gendered aspects of the household.
E. Social Norms
Mainstream economics assumes that individuals are rational and
106
thus that their decisions reflect their choices and preferences. These
107
preferences are held to be stable and unrelated to society. Moreover,
108
these preferences are taken as a given and are not questioned. Feminist
economics challenges these assumptions. Feminist economics stresses
that people are not rational utility maximizers and that their preferences
109
cannot be seen as preordained. People’s preferences are influenced by
110
social norms and are not static but rather are constantly changing.
The individual is not separate from society. Rather, there are complex
relations between the individual and society, where society affects the
individual and vice versa. Feminist economics especially stresses the way
in which gender norms shape women’s and men’s choices, preferences,
111
and options. In other words, social conditions of patriarchy, inequality, and discrimination influence how both women and men economically perform and function. Social norms might sometimes limit people’s choices, and people’s choices might change social norms.

102.
103.
104.
105.

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Himmelweit, supra note 75, at 66.
Id.
See id. at 65-66.
See Susan Himmelweit, Cristina Santos, Almudena Sevila & Catherine Sofer, Sharing
of Resources Within the Family and the Economics of Household Decision-Making, 75 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 625 (2013).
Himmelweit, supra note 75, at 66.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 67.
See Rebecca Pearse & Raewyn Connell, Gender Norms and the Economy: Insights from
Social Research, 22 FEMINIST ECON. 30 (2016); Himmelweit, supra note 75, at 67.
Himmelweit, supra note 75, at 67.
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For example, the employment rate of mothers of young children is
influenced by social attitudes and norms regarding employment and
motherhood. At the same time, as more mothers of young children en112
ter the workforce, these social attitudes and norms change. Though
other economic schools have also pointed to the importance of social
113
norms, the masculine model of economics is still dominant, and feminist economics places particular emphasis on the importance of gender
114
norms to economic analysis.
F. Well-Being
According to feminist economics, well-being is not limited to
115
monetary gains. For example, living in a caring and equal society and
living in a society with good health and education systems each increase
the well-being of women and men and of individuals and society writ
116
large. Though other economic schools have advocated for broadening
117
the analysis of well-being, feminist economics in particular has chal118
lenged the gendered aspects of well-being. It is not sufficient to account for women’s well-being in addition to men’s. Rather, it is critical
to profoundly alter the very definition of well-being to include women’s
perspectives on the concept.
This Article has described mainstream economics in very broad,
general strokes, and has not sought to account for differences between
various economic theories. Similarly, this Article has portrayed only the
most general tenets of feminist economics, without addressing the different approaches within feminist economics. Furthermore, though fem119
inist economics has theoretical dimensions as well as political, meth120
121
122
odological, pedagogical, and epistemological dimensions, this

112. Id. at 67-78.
113. See, e.g., Jon Elster, Social Norms and Economic Theory, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 99-101
(1989).
114. Himmelweit, supra note 75.
115. Myra H. Strober, Rethinking Economics Through a Feminist Lens, 84 AM. ECON. REV.
143 (1994). See generally J. Allister McGregor & Nicky Pouw, Towards an Economics
of Wellbeing, 41 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 1123 (2016).
116. Himmelweit, supra note 75, at 72.
117. See, e.g., McGregor & Pouw, supra note 115.
118. Himmelweit, supra note 75, at 72.
119. See, e.g., Astrid Agenjo-Calderón & Lina Gálvez-Muñoz, Feminist Economics: Theoretical and Political Dimensions, 78 AM. J. ECON. & SOCIO. 137, 138-9 (2019).
120. See, e.g., Diana Strassmann, Expanding the Methodological Boundaries of Economics, 3
FEMINIST ECON., at i, vii-viii (1997); Diana Strassmann, Feminist Economic Method-
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Article focuses exclusively on the theoretical. With that, alongside this
absence of certain nuances, this Article provides a broad picture of the
contrast between mainstream economics and feminist economics.
As noted, feminist economics is not the only heterodox economic
school, and there are other approaches to economics that challenge
mainstream economics. However, feminist economics is an important
critique of the dominant approach to economics. Feminist economics
documents the differences in well-being between men and women, advocates policies which will promote equity, and conducts research free
123
from androcentric bias.
Feminist economics, then, combines insights from both economics
and feminist theory. The “feminist” in feminist economics means that
feminist economics seeks to challenge mainstream economics from a holistic feminist perspective. Not only does feminist economics broaden
mainstream economics to include women, but it also disputes the basis
of mainstream economics. It challenges mainstream economics’ purported objectivity and neutrality and exposes the male biases and androcentricity of mainstream economics. It calls into question the theoretical
foundations of mainstream economics and does not make do with merely including women, but rather insists on including gender and gender
analysis in a profound, substantive manner. Feminist economics exposes
the ways in which the entire economy is gendered.
The “economics” in feminist economics means that feminist economics exposes the economic nature of institutions (like family) that are
viewed as existing outside of the economy. It challenges the limited and
narrow scope of mainstream economics that ignores women’s work. It
unveils the economics of women’s labor. This makes feminist economics
a unique school of feminist analysis. Just as some feminist theories focus
on identity, equality, sexuality, or power, feminist economics addresses
124
the economics of gender.

121.

122.
123.
124.

ologies, 14 FEMINIST ECON. 1, 1-2 (2008); Sheba Tejani, What’s Feminist About Feminist Economics?, 26 J. ECON. METHODOLOGY 99 (2019).
See, e.g., Margaret Lewis & Kim Marie McGoldrick, Moving Beyond the Masculine
Neoclassical Classroom, 7 FEMINIST ECON. 91 (2001); April Laskey Aerni, Robin L.
Bartlett, Margaret Lewis, Kim Marie McGoldrick & Jean Shackelford, Toward a
Feminist Pedagogy in Economics, 5 FEMINIST ECON. 29 (1999).
See, e.g., Janet Seiz, Epistemology and the Tasks of Feminist Economics, 1 FEMINIST
ECON. 110 (1995).
Frances R. Woolley, The Feminist Challenge to Neoclassical Economics, 17 CAMBRIDGE
J. ECON. 485 (1993).
See Nancy Fraser, Feminism, Capitalism, and the Cunning of History, 56 NEW LEFT
REV. 97 (2009) (containing a feminist critique of capitalism).
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Though other critical approaches to contract law, such as relational
contract law for example, share some insights with feminist economics,
they lack the aforementioned feminist and economic aspects. In other
words, feminist economics, while not the only critical perspective on
contract law, is unique in its ability to challenge the gendered aspects of
contract law. Relational theory of contract law, to continue with the
above example, addresses social aspects of contract law, but fails to address its gender bias and the economic impact of such bias. Relational
theory likewise addresses economic imbalance of power between parties,
but fails to address power dynamics that result from patriarchy. Thus,
the perspectives on contract law found within feminist economics are
valuable even in cases in which said perspectives overlap with other critical theories.
III. A Feminist Economic Analysis of Promissory Estoppel
Formation of contract under the bargain theory focuses on market
transactions. Classic contract law envisions rational parties who contract
125
in order to maximize utility. Promissory estoppel is an alternative
route to formation that opens contract law to other non-market rela126
tions and to social policy considerations. Applying the principles of
feminist economics to promissory estoppel reveals how promissory estoppel broadens contract law: Formation of contract is not limited to
consideration and to bargain, enforceable promises are not limited to
the market sphere, and parties’ motivations are not limited to wealth
maximization. Rather, promissory estoppel promotes cooperation, trust,
altruism, and caring; it integrates reliance, justice, fairness, and relationships into contracts; and it includes agreements between family members as an integral part of contract law.
Promissory estoppel also makes contract law more pluralistic and
inclusive. Promissory estoppel broadens contract law to include women’s interests and perspectives as an integral part of the economy. At the
same time promissory estoppel challenges the gendered bias of economics under the doctrine of consideration by adding non-market activities.

125. See POSNER, supra note 1.
126. Gan, supra note 5, at 48.
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A. Borelli v. Brusseau
127

In Borelli v. Brusseau, a husband was very ill and wished to be
128
cared for at home by his wife rather than by nurses in a hospital. He
promised to transfer some of his personal property to his wife in ex129
change for her care. She performed her promised duties and took care
130
of him until his death. Yet, he did not carry out his end of the deal,
131
and he instead left his property to his daughter in his will. The court
concluded there was no binding contract due to lack of consideration,
ruling that “personal performance of a personal duty created by the contract of marriage does not constitute a new consideration supporting the
132
indebtedness, alleged in this case.” The dissent held that the wife’s
care work satisfied the required consideration, and thus an enforceable
133
contract was made between the husband and wife. Promissory estoppel was not discussed. However, the following application of feminist
economic analysis shows why the court should have applied promissory
estoppel in order to enforce the promise in this case.
B. Valuing Care Work
The court’s decision in Borelli not only denies the wife’s right to
receive the money promised to her, but also disregards and devalues her
134
care work itself. It views her care work as part of her marital duties,
and thus not as something substantive or worthy of note. It is not something she might exchange for reciprocal value. According to the majority, the woman in this case did nothing more than act as a good, obedi135
Alternatively, the enforcement of the promise using
ent wife.
promissory estoppel would give the care work value and importance. It
would bestow high regard upon the labor of caring, and as a result,
would award the wife the compensation promised for her care work. As
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Borrelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17-18.
Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17-18.
Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18.
Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18.
Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20.
Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20, 25. This case is still good law. It is cited by In re Marriage of Bonds, 24 Cal. 4th 1, 25 (2000); Estate of Stewart, No. A148396, 2019 WL
1746687, at *21 n.20 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2019).
134. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 19.
135. See Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 19 (“[A] wife is obligated by the marriage contract to
provide nursing-type care to an ill husband.”).
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136

the dissent showed in this case, the wife did something well beyond
her marital duties.
It might seem that awarding the wife compensation devalues her
care work in that it treats her primarily as a nurse, rather than as a wife.
Doing care work for love, it might be argued, is morally superior to doing so for money. However, awarding the wife compensation for her
role as a nurse does not undermine the moral value of her role as a loving wife. The wife, in this case, provided care work both out of love and
with the anticipation that she would be fairly compensated. These motivations coexist and are not mutually exclusive. Commodification considerations are valuable considerations, but enforcing the promise in a
case like this would neither commodify the wife’s care work nor degrade
it. By enforcing the promise, the court would validate the values both
parties attached to the wife’s care work. Enforcing the contract would
not mean treating the wife’s caring as a commodity provided with no
emotions, or strictly as part of her professional duties. Awarding the wife
the promised property would not mean she did not care for her husband
137
or that she acted as a professional nurse. Women’s right to contract
with their husbands or others (a right women earned in the 19th centu138
ry) is an important economic right that enhances women’s autonomy.
The contract in this case should be treated like any other marital agreement, which can be enforced without devaluing the love relations of the
couple.

136. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 24.
137. For a feminist economics analysis of care work done by professional nurses, see Valerie Adams & Rhonda Sharp, Reciprocity in Caring Labor: Nurses’ Work in Residential
Aged Care in Australia, 19 FEMINIST ECON. 100 (2013); Valerie Adams & Julie A.
Nelson, The Economics of Nursing: Articulating Care, 15 FEMINIST ECON. 3 (2009);
Julie A. Nelson & Nancy Folbre, Why a Well-Paid Nurse Is a Better Nurse, 24 NURSE
ECON. 127 (2006); Lisa Dodson & Rebekah M. Zincavage, “It’s Like a Family”: Caring Labor, Exploitation, and Race in Nursing Homes, 21 GENDER & SOC’Y 905
(2007).
For the commodification of housework, see Katharine Silbaugh, Commodification and Women’s Household Labor, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 81 (1997); Katharine
Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1
(1996).
138. Richard H. Chused, Married Women’s Property and Inheritance by Widows in Massachusetts: A Study of Wills Probated Between 1800 and 1850, 2 BERKELEY WOMEN’S
L.J. 42 (1986); Richard H. Chused, Married Women’s Property Law: 1800-1850, 71
GEO. L.J. 1359 (1983).
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C. Enforcing Intra-Family Promises
The court’s decision in Borelli excludes promises between spouses,
since personal performance of marital duties does not qualify as consid139
eration. The court thus maintains the market-family dichotomy. This
leaves intra-family promises outside the scope of contract law. Enforcing
a promise under promissory estoppel broadens contract law beyond the
market. Promises in the intra-family context should also be binding. As
the dissent pointed out, had the wife been a professional nurse and not
the husband’s wife, her care work would qualify as consideration and his
140
promise would have been enforceable. People relate to one another in
different ways, not only through the market. Consideration narrowly
values only one such way and excludes all others. Promissory estoppel,
on the other hand, supplements the doctrine of consideration and includes in its scope other relations, and thus broadens contract law.
It might appear that enforcing intra-family promises using promissory estoppel still maintains hierarchy. Commercial promises will be enforced under the doctrine of consideration, while familial promises will
be enforced by a separate doctrine of promissory estoppel. In this view,
consideration is the main doctrine of contract formation, while promissory estoppel remains a secondary doctrine. In other words, if consideration is the main entrance to the contract world, the wife (and other
women) could use promissory estoppel as the back door to enter into
the contract world.
However, having an alternative doctrine of contract formation does
not necessarily mean that there will be a hierarchy. Consideration and
promissory estoppel are, in fact, two equal doctrines. In some cases,
both apply and promisees argue that the promise should be enforced
141
under either doctrine. Some scholars point out that both consideration and promissory estoppel serve the same screening goal: They both
142
distinguish enforceable from unenforceable promises. Other scholars
143
call for uniting both doctrines into a single doctrine. Having two
formation doctrines side by side does not necessarily entail hierarchy:
Both can be seen as main doors to the contract world.

139. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20.
140. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 23.
141. Stanley D. Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78
YALE L.J. 343, 352 (1969).
142. See, e.g., Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE
L.J. 111, 113 (1991).
143. See, e.g., Farber & Matheson, supra note 53, at 905.
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D. Love as Motivation to Contract
The court decision in Borelli saw the wife’s care work as part of her
144
marital duties and thus not subject to contract. Promissory estoppel
acknowledges the existence of relations other than market relations, recognizes different motivations for contracting other than utility maximization, and acknowledges that there are gains other than monetary ones.
The wife in this case was motivated by her love for her husband,
but this motivation should not be left outside the scope of contract
145
law. She was not a selfish, rational, utility-maximizing individual; rather, their agreement reflects a relationship of trust, mutual respect, and
interdependence. The wife acted in a manner that was based on her love
for her husband, as well as for the sake of the money promised. Her example demonstrated that people act not only as rational wealthmaximizers, but also for other non-monetary reasons.
People are complex and behave out of more than one motivation.
The court imposed a binary: The wife either contracted for money or
acted on the basis of her marital duties. Promissory estoppel is an alternative rationale, which demonstrates that both are true in her case. Her
love for her husband does not negate the fact that she deserves to be
awarded the money promised to her. These motivations of love and the
property promised are not mutually exclusive to one another: They can
and often do live side by side. Rather than employing binary thinking
according to which one either acts in the market sphere for selfish motivations or one acts in the family sphere for love, feminist economics
provides a more complex—and humanly accurate—picture in which
146
people may act for both reasons. In other words, family members may
act for economic considerations, and so too may commercial parties act
for non-monetary considerations. In both contexts, people act on the
basis of more than one motivation.

144. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 21.
145. For incorporating values such as love and caring into contract law, see Linda Mulcahy, The Limitations of Love and Altruism, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON
CONTRACT LAW 1 (Linda Mulcahy & Sally Wheeler eds., 2005).
146. Nancy Folbre & Julie A. Nelson, For Love or Money—or Both?, 14 J. ECON. PERSPS.
123 (2000); Julie A. Nelson, For Love or Money? Defining Relationships in Law and
Life: Does Profit-Seeking Rule Out Love? Evidence (or Not) from Economics and Law, 35
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 69 (2011).
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E. Acknowledging Different Interests of Different Family Members
Borelli also demonstrates that different family members often have
different interests. The suit revealed a conflict of interests between the
spouses: Both wanted the husband’s property, and while the husband
wished to be nursed by wife at home, she preferred that he would re147
main instead in the hospital. The dissent hints at the fact that the wife
contemplated divorcing her husband due to his health condition, but
she ultimately chose instead to stay married to him and to take care of
148
him until his death. Their agreement amounted to a compromise between these different interests and preferences. Yet the court did not en149
force this compromise, valuing only the husband’s interests and preferences.
Rather than automatically assuming domestic harmony, the law
150
should directly address conflicts between spouses, as did the dissent.
In this vein, the dissent respected the compromise the couple reached.
The imposed view of automatically supposed harmony obscures the
power dynamics in this family: The wife performed her promise and
cared for her husband, while the husband did not perform his end of
the deal, though he benefited from his wife’s care work. The harmony,
in this case, is actually simply the rule of the stronger party, and is thus a
false harmony.
The majority in Borelli perpetuated this grave imbalance. Because
the majority automatically assumed the existence of unified, shared familial interests, it was unable to see the wife’s separate interests. The dissent, however, would have mitigated this disparity by recognizing the
conflict of interests between the parties, enforcing the compromise they
reached, and awarding the wife the promised property. The dissent balanced the different interests between two contracting parties and sought
to correct the uneven distribution caused by the husband’s breach of his
promise. As noted earlier, the household is not a unit but rather is com151
posed of different members who may have conflicting interests. The
dissent in Borelli shows that contract law can be a tool to resolve this
conflict of interests.

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17.
Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 24.
Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20.
Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 22.
See supra Part II.D.
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F. Acknowledging Social Norms
The case of Borelli v. Brusseau demonstrates that social norms—
and especially gender norms—influence the parties’ contract. The power
dynamics between the spouses necessarily shape their agreement. The
152
husband had more money than the wife, such that he could purchase
the wife’s nursing and care work. She acted as a dutiful wife, cared for
her husband, and looked after him until he died. In order to understand
their agreement, we need to look at the social background. Gender roles
and social expectations shaped their agreement. The wife’s decision to
care for her husband was influenced by social norms and expectations of
married women.
The contract is not an island isolated from its surroundings. A contract is rooted in its social context. Entering the oral agreement was not
simply the result of the wife’s calculation and analysis of costs and benefits, but also derived from the societal gender role of a wife. It is no coincidence that it is the wife taking care of her husband and not the other
way around.
Furthermore, one has to consider the power dynamics between
men and women. Gender relations within the family are the background for the agreement between wife and husband. With that, even if
it were a husband taking care of his wife, the promise should still be enforced under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Care work, which is
mostly done by women, is undervalued and should receive economic
153
and social appreciation, whether done by women or men.
It seems that the court was influenced by gender roles in marriage.
According to the majority, the wife simply performed her marital du154
ties. Promissory estoppel demonstrates alternative social norms according to which care work is valuable and, even when done with love,
deserves compensation. The dissent pointed to the old precedents upon
which the majority relied in order to stress that this ruling was based on
155
archaic notions regarding marriage. Social norms have changed and
these updated norms should apply to the parties’ agreement. Today,
spouses enter contracts with one another and make marital and other

152. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17.
153. See Cary C. Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83 (2010) (highlighting how Ruth Bader Ginsburg advanced anti-stereotyping theory to promote equality for women by first advocating
the theory in sex discrimination cases where men were the plaintiffs).
154. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
155. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
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agreements. In fact, the couple in Borelli signed a prenuptial agree156
ment.
The dissent used the Clintons’ marriage to stress how the majori157
ty’s concept of marriage is outdated. According to the dissent, “To
contend in 1993 that such a contract is without consideration means
that if Mrs. Clinton becomes ill, President Clinton must drop every158
thing and personally care for her.” The Clinton example exposes the
gender bias of the majority. The care that is expected of the wife seems
odd when applied to President Clinton. Though the majority uses gender neutral language, the dissent’s role reversal (Secretary Clinton needs
President Clinton’s care) reveals that the majority’s ruling is based on
social roles and social expectations that apply to women but not to men.
According to the dissent, care work, whether done by women or men,
159
qualifies as consideration.
The majority stressed that marital contracts are different from oth160
er contracts since there is public interest in marriage. However, the
majority failed to consider the influences of society on the marital contract. According to the majority, each spouse has a duty to care for the
161
other spouse. The majority’s gender-neutral statement disregards both
gender roles in marriage and social perceptions of husbands and wives,
and the resultant expectations from each group.
Borelli might appear to be a modification of contract case. According to this analysis, the husband and wife had a marriage agreement obligating the wife to take care of her husband. The wife wanted to modify
this agreement to include the husband’s obligation to transfer the property to her. Since this is a duress case in which the wife wanted to extort
extra compensation beyond the original agreed upon compensation, the
modified agreement is unenforceable. There should be no consideration
for this contract modification. The wife’s care work must be seen as her
obligation under the original contract, and she did not provide new
consideration for the modified contract. Therefore, under this perspective, this contract is not enforceable.
However, it should be noted that even under this interpretation of
the case, one still needs to look at social norms in order to determine the
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 19 (“It is fundamental that a marriage contract differs from
other contractual relations in that there exists a definite and vital public interest in
reference to the marriage relation.”).
161. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
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spouses’ obligations to one another under the marriage contract—that
is, the original contract. The contract modification reading of the case is
also based on societal conceptions of marital contract.
This case demonstrates that marriage is a social institution, one
that changes over time. Marriage has many meanings: It is a coverture, a
status, a contract; it is about love, it is about money; it is a relation between two people, it is a relation between two families, it is the creation
of a new family; it once referred only to heterosexual couples but now
includes same-sex couples. More meanings could be added to this list,
but even this abbreviated litany highlights the dynamic, pluralist, and
complex notion of marriage. Feminist economics urges contract law to
162
take social context into account. Furthermore, even though Borelli is a
1993 case, societal and gender-social context remains as relevant today
163
as it was over twenty-five years ago.
G. Furthering Distributive Justice
Not enforcing a promise has distributive implications. As the dis164
sent pointed out, the husband and wife in Borelli made an agreement.
The wife performed her part of the agreement while husband did not
perform his. The majority failed to correct this imbalance. This left the
husband with the care from which he benefitted as a result of the
agreement, even as he did not deliver the property promised to the wife.
Promissory estoppel would enable the court to intervene and restore the
equilibrium. Enforcing the promise using promissory estoppel would
165
advance distributive justice. It would enable weaker parties to enforce
promises made to them. It would prevent stronger parties from denying
their promise after benefitting from it. As caring is considered feminine
166
in our society and is mostly done by women, enforcing the husband’s
promise in a case like this one would promote equality between women
and men. In other words, the line between enforceable and unenforceable promises is gendered and not neutral. Promissory estoppel expands
the borders of contract law, making the law itself more inclusive.
It might seem that applying contract law to family agreements is
harmful to women. According to this view, regulating family through
162. See supra Part II.E.
163. An example of changes in the marriage institution is its recent inclusion of same-sex
marriage. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
164. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr., at 20.
165. Gan, supra note 27.
166. Folbre, supra note 87.
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cold, formal, rigid economic rules of contract law might disadvantage
women, and thus it is better to leave the family outside the realm of
contract law. The family should remain a place where love—rather than
contracts—rules. While this is a valid concern, it should be noted that
the justice element of promissory estoppel makes contract law less cold
and rigid, and thus explicitly protects weaker parties, such as women,
from misuse of contract law. The justice element may be used to apply
public policy considerations that will guarantee contract law will not be
used to harm women. Moreover, this case demonstrates the harm of excluding intra-family promises from contract law. It highlights the distributive implications of regarding the family in exclusively noncontractual terms. As family law scholar Jill Hasday observes, the law
regulates economic exchange between intimates:
The relevant legal question is not, and has never been,
whether intimates will exchange economic assets; it is when
they will do so, how, why, in what forms, and to what ends.
Economic exchange is not foreign to intimate relations, either as a matter of first principles or as a positive matter of le167
gal regulation.
Furthermore, the failure to intervene in family matters is not an act of
neutrality, but rather is one that actively maintains the status quo. Nonintervention and non-redistribution mean that family is left outside the
law, to be governed by the privileged party, usually men. As Borelli
demonstrates, the decision not to enforce the husband’s promise means
that the husband gets to break his promise and still get the care he was
promised. The privileged and richer party reaps the contract’s benefits,
while the underprivileged, poorer party gets nothing in exchange for her
care labor. More generally, contract law shaped by the insights of feminist economics will seek to benefit, rather than harm, both women and
men.
According to the dissent in Borelli, the promise was enforceable
168
under the doctrine of consideration. However, this does not mean
there is no need for promissory estoppel in such cases nor does it render
promissory estoppel insignificant. Promissory estoppel is a different
route of enforcement; unlike consideration, it is based on reliance and
justice. The fact that in some cases a promise could be enforced based

167. Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 HARV. L. REV. 491, 493
(2005).
168. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
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on either doctrine does not mean promissory estoppel is redundant;
there are many other cases in which no consideration is present and
169
promissory estoppel becomes the only way to enforce a promise. In
the same vein, having a broad notion of consideration means that many
promissory estoppel cases will be included, but that some will still be excluded. Thus, in some cases, enforceability of promises will still depend
on promissory estoppel only. Furthermore, applying promissory estoppel shuns the binary thinking (for example, the market-family dichotomy) of the doctrine of consideration and thus avoids the risk of commodifying care work. Promissory estoppel provides a complex and nunuanced approach to contract formation rather than a hierarchal one.
Though the end result is the same, enforcing the promise because care
work qualifies as consideration is different than enforcing the promise
because of the promisee’s reliance.
It might seem that Borelli raises family law issues rather than contract law issues. In other words, this legal conflict should be resolved by
applying laws of inheritance and succession instead of contract law.
170
However, this legal dispute is about a breach of promise. The parties
to this legal suit are a promisor and a promisee, not the wife and the
daughter. The wife’s argument is that her late husband’s promise should
be honored, and that she, not the daughter, is the rightful owner and
that the deceased’s promise should overrule the will. Framing this case
as an inheritance case takes the promise, which is the basis of the case,
out of the picture.
The above feminist economic analysis criticizes the court’s decision
in Borelli and calls for the enforcement of the husband’s promise in this
case. Denying that a contract was made in this case results in distributive injustice. The majority opinion maintains a strong divide between
the market and the family, and between rational wealth maximization
and altruistic care work. Not enforcing the promise in Borelli disregards
intra-familial promises and care work.
Applying promissory estoppel would respect such promises. It
would expand contract law to these promises, though they are outside
the scope of the market. It will not only advance distributive justice and
equity but will also refute traditional gender roles in marriage. Including
intra-family promises in contract law will broaden formation of contract
and refute binary thinking and the market-home hierarchy. The next

169. For example, gratuitous promises are enforced using promissory estoppel. See infra
notes 182-84.
170. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
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subpart will go beyond the Borelli example to discuss a general feminist
economic analysis of promissory estoppel.
H. Promissory Estoppel from a Feminist Economics Perspective
The contribution of feminist economics to the doctrine of promissory estoppel is apparent in other cases. Recall the Ricketts case, whose
171
facts were given in the introduction. Like Borelli, this case shows the
importance of broadening contract law beyond the market, and enforcing promises in spite of lack of consideration. Both of these cases in172
clude agreements between family members in contract law. The bargain theory leaves such promises outside of the world of contract;
however, promissory estoppel enables family members to manage their
relations using contracts. Furthermore, these cases expand contract law
beyond efficiency considerations and utility maximization. Parties are
not only players in the market, but they are also family members. Market transactions are important, but so are gifts and care work; commercial relations are important, but so are family relations; economic considerations and motivations are important, but so are love and caring.
In Ricketts (like in Borelli) family members treated each other with
love and care. Their contracts reflect caring and devotion to one another. At the same time, Ricketts (like Borelli) reflects that different family
members might have different interests. The executor, who represented
the deceased’s interests, maintained that the promise should not be enforced; the granddaughter, who quit her job in reliance on her grandfa173
ther’s promise, had the opposite interest. Though relations between
family members are much closer than market relations, family members
too have differences of opinions. Contract law might be a tool to manage these differences by reaching compromises. Finally, Ricketts demonstrates the importance of social background. The grandfather’s promise
174
was based on his statement that none of his grandchildren work.
Thus, his promise reflects his class, and his perception of work and life175
style. The granddaughter immediately quit her job and retained the
lifestyle she could now afford thanks to her grandfather. This social context is important in order to understand the contract, the grandfather’s
promise, and the granddaughter’s reaction to his promise.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898).
See also, e.g., Harvey v. Dow, 962 A.2d 322 (Me. 2008).
Ricketts, 77 N.W. at 366.
Ricketts, 77 N.W. at 366.
Ricketts, 77 N.W. at 366.
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As these examples show, promissory estoppel is an important doctrine. Promissory estoppel goes beyond commercial agreements to also
include promises made in the family setting. Promissory estoppel opens
the possibility of enforcing promises between family members and not
only between two parties conducting business together. It is sometimes
difficult to meet the requirements of the doctrine of consideration.
Promissory estoppel provides a route to enforce such promises in the
non-market setting. This broadens the boundaries of contract law and
relaxes the market-home binary. It treats family agreements as an integral part of contract law.
Promissory estoppel cases in the family context show that the
household is not a singular unit, but rather that different household
members may have different interests, perspectives, and preferences.
These different views might lead to a legal conflict between family
members. If the family is not a singular unit, it makes sense to talk
about contracts between family members. Contract is the way in which
family members might choose to manage their conflicts and disagreements. Contracts may be used to enforce compromises between family
members. Promissory estoppel, then, is the main formation rule for contracts in the family setting.
Promissory estoppel cases cover a variety of contractual relations,
and not only intra-family relations. Some of these cases deal with prom176
177
ises made during market activities such as employment, construc178
179
180
181
tion deals, insurance, franchise, and loans. However, other cases

176. Annabelle P. Harris, The Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel in an Arm’s Length Commercial Transaction in Tennessee: A Primer, 49 U. MEM. L. REV. 813, 823 (2019); Randy
E. Barnett & Mary E. Becker, Beyond Reliance: Promissory Estoppel, Contract Formalities, and Misrepresentations, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 443, 449-50 (1987); Sidney W.
DeLong, The New Requirement of Enforcement Reliance in Commercial Promissory Estoppel: Section 90 as Catch-22, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 943, 946 (1997); Kevin M. Teeven,
The Advent of Recovery on Market Transactions in the Absence of a Bargain, 39 AM.
BUS. L.J. 289, 333 (2002).
177. See generally Robert A. Hillman, The Unfulfilled Promise of Promissory Estoppel in the
Employment Setting, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (1999); Cortlan H. Maddux, Comment,
EMPLOYERS BEWARE! The Emerging Use of Promissory Estoppel as an Exception to
Employment at Will, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 197 (1997); Joanna C. Kloet, Comment, Using Promissory Estoppel to Preserve Traditional Contract Principles and Protect Employee
Rights, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1235 (2005); Robert A. Hillman, Drafting Chapter 2
of the ALI’s Employment Law Restatement in the Shadow of Contract Law: An Assessment of the Challenges and Results, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1341 (2015).
178. See generally Alfred S. Konefsky, Freedom and Interdependence in Twentieth-Century
Contract Law: Traynor and Hand and Promissory Estoppel, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 1169,
1205 (1997); Kai-Niklas A. Schneider, Maryland’s Application of Promissory Estoppel
in Construction Industry Bidding Disputes: Eliminating Further Confusion, 30 U. BALT.
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184

deal with charity, donations, and gifts. The analysis of feminist
economics is not limited to intra-family settings and is relevant to these
promissory estoppel cases as well.
185
Take, for example, King v. Trustees of Boston University. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., an alumnus of Boston University, promised in a

179.

180.

181.

182.

183.

184.

185.

L. REV. 171 (2000); Janine McPeters Murphy, Note, Promissory Estoppel: Subcontractors’ Liability in Construction Bidding Cases, 63 N.C. L. REV. 387 (1985); Dorothy
Hemmer Bishop, Comment, The Subcontractor’s Bid: An Option Contract Arising
Through Promissory Estoppel, 34 EMORY L.J. 421 (1985).
See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Clark, 456 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1972); Marker
v. Preferred Life Ins. Co., 506 P.2d 1163 (Kan. 1973); Green v. Helmcamp Ins.
Agency, 499 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. App. 1973).
See, e.g., R.G. Grp., Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1984);
Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby, 144 A.2d 123 (Del. 1958); Klinke v. Famous Recipe
Fried Chicken, Inc., 616 P.2d 644 (Wash. 1980). See generally Gregory M. Duhl,
Red Owl’s Legacy, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 297 (2003); Robert A. Hillman, Contract: Precedent in Contract Cases and the Importance(?) of the Whole Story, 87 TEMP. L. REV.
759, 761-63 (2015); Robert E. Scott, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores and the Myth of
Precontractual Reliance, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 71 (2007); William C. Whitford & Stewart
Macaulay, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores: The Rest of the Story, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 801
(2010).
Amy B. Parker, Mending Broken Promises: Allowing Homeowners to Pursue Claims of
Promissory Estoppel Against Lenders When Denied Loan Modifications, 47 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 985 (2013).
See, e.g., Danby v. Osteopathic Hosp. Ass’n, 104 A.2d 903 (Del. 1954); Maryland
Nat’l Bank v. United Jewish Appeal Fed’n, 407 A.2d 1130 (Md. 1979); Congregation Kadimah Toras-Moshe v. DeLeo, 540 N.E.2d691 (Mass. 1989); Estate of Timko v. Oral Roberts Evangelistic Ass’n, 215 N.W.2d 750 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974).
See, e.g., Estate of Bucci v. Sandoval, 488 P.2d 216 (Colo. App. 1971); Greiner v.
Greiner, 293 P. 759 (Kan. 1930); see also, Sabine Tsuruda, Contract, Power, and the
Value of Donative Promises, 69 S.C. L. REV. 479, 490-99 (2017); Warren A. Seavey,
Reliance upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64 HARV. L. REV. 913 (1951);
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 23-31 (1979); William A. Drennan, Charitable Pledges: Contracts of Confusion, 120 PENN ST. L. REV.
477 (2015).
See, e.g., Benjamin F. Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Principle from Precedents: I, 50
MICH. L. REV. 639, 640 (1952); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The World of Contract and
the World of Gift, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 821, 855 (1997); Andrew Kull, Reconsidering
Gratuitous Promises, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 39 (1992); Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous
Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411, 411 (1977); Kevin M. Teeven,
A Legal History of Binding Gratuitous Promises at Common Law: Justifiable Reliance
and Moral Obligation, 43 DUQ. L. REV. 11, 11 (2004); Alex M. Johnson Jr., Irrevocable Gift Promises and Promises Inducing Reliance: A Mandate for the Return of the Seal
in Contract Law, 98 NEB. L. REV. 926 (2019); Stéphane Sérafin, Gifts and Contracts:
A Comparison with Quebec Civil Law, UBC L. Rev. (forthcoming)
(https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3600192).
King v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., 647 N.E.2d 1196 (Mass. 1995).
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note to transfer title to his papers to Boston University. His wife, the
187
administrator of his estate, challenged the University’s claim. The
court nevertheless ruled that “Dr. King made a promise to give absolute
title to his papers to BU in a letter signed by him . . . and that the
promise to give the papers was enforceable as a charitable pledge sup188
ported by consideration or reliance.” Though the court did not adopt
the standard of Section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, it
189
did rule based on the elements of promise and reasonable reliance.
The feminist economic analysis in this Article supports the enforcement of the note in this case. Like in the former cases, doing so expands contract law beyond the market. It enforces promises in noncommercial contexts: donations, charities, and gifts, in addition to families. Furthermore, it demonstrates that people act not just as rational
utility maximizers. Here, the gift to the University was not based on
profits or enhancing benefits to King, but rather on a wish that the pa190
pers would be used for academic research.
This case also demonstrates the importance of social context. The
promise to the University was based on the relations of an alumnus to
his university. The University wanted its library to hold the papers of its
famous alumnus and King wanted his writings to be archived and to be
191
the subject of historical and other academic studies. Like family relations, these relations reflect a richer world of relationships not limited to
commercial bargains. Race is also part of the social context. King was
192
approached by Morehouse College, his undergraduate alma mater. He
was concerned that he would be criticized for preferring Boston Univer193
sity to a Black institution in the South. Racial considerations played a
part in his decision whether to give his papers to Boston University or to
Morehouse College.
Lastly, this case demonstrates that family is not a singular unit but
rather consists of individuals with different perspectives, interests, and
preferences. Dr. King and his wife did not see the gift to Boston University the same way: While he wrote a note stating his wishes to donate his
papers to the University, after his death, his wife did not wish to deliver

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

King, 647 N.E.2d at 1198-99.
King, 647 N.E.2d at 1198.
King, 647 N.E.2d at 1199.
King, 647 N.E.2d at 1200-03.
King, 647 N.E.2d at 1199.
King, 647 N.E.2d at 1199.
King, 647 N.E.2d at 1198.
King, 647 N.E.2d at 1198.
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the papers to the University. Enforcing the non-bargained-for promise
in this case enriches contract law by broadening it and including within
its scope promises in contexts of donations and gifts. The donor-donee
relations are significant and it is thus important that contract law applies
to these relations in cases where the promisor withdraws his or her
promise.
Feminist economics is relevant even to commercial promissory estoppel cases. Take, for example, Quake Construction, Inc. v. American
195
Airlines, Inc. In this case, a subcontractor sued the contractor for failing to reach an agreement following a letter of intent. Mayor Harold
Washington, the first Black mayor of Chicago, sought to open up public projects to minority businesses. The subcontractor was such a minor196
ity owned business. Following a bid for the expansion of the O’Hare
Airport the subcontractor was told it has been awarded the contract for
the project. Though a letter of intent was sent no contract was signed.
After the subcontractor participated in a preconstruction meeting for
the project it was told that it would not take part in the project. The
subcontractor sued for breach of contract. In this promissory estoppel
case one needs to look at the political and racial context of the negotia197
tions for construction work at the O’Hare Airport. This important
background includes the political agenda of promoting minority businesses in Chicago. As in the previous cases, the promise and the reliance
on the promise in this case are rooted in social context.
The same applies also to promissory estoppel in the employment
198
context. Take, for example, the famous Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co. In that
case, the employer made a promise to an employee to pay her a retire199
200
ment pension for life. She retired, relying on this promise. The
201
court awarded her promised pension based on promissory estoppel.
Like the aforementioned cases, the relations between the parties provide
important background to the case. In particular, gender norms in the
job market provide important social context. Gender influences wom-

194. King, 647 N.E.2d at 1203.
195. Quake Constr., Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 990 (Ill. 1990).
196. Quake Constr., 565 N.E.2d at 990; see Judith L. Maute, Race Politics, O’Hare Airport
Expansion, and Promissory Estoppel: The More Things Change, the More They Stay the
Same, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 119 (2017).
197. See Maute, supra note 196, at 122-29 (putting Quake Constr. in a political and historical context).
198. Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959).
199. Feinberg, 322 S.W.2d at 165-65.
200. Feinberg, 322 S.W.2d at 166.
201. Feinberg, 322 S.W.2d at 168-69.
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en’s decisions to work (rather than stay at home), what kind of work
they do (as the job market is segregated), their employment conditions
and terms (as employment discrimination still prevails), their retire202
ment, and so on.
This sample of promissory estoppel cases highlights the diversity of
relations between parties. Parties interrelate with each other in different
settings and they are motivated by factors other than utility maximization. For example, cases involving charity and donations demonstrate
that people wish to donate to good causes and to benefit people they
203
care about. People are not only selfish and rational but also act for al204
truistic and caring reasons. Promissory estoppel paves the way to include these motivations and promises within the scope of contract law.
Enforcing such promises using contract law awards them the respect and
value they deserve.
Broadening contract law to include non-bargained-for promises
and non-commercial promises does not mean all promises will be enforced under promissory estoppel. Some promises will not satisfy Sec205
tion 90’s elements and thus will not be enforced. Other promises will
not be enforceable because the parties did not wish to be legally bound.
Even a significant doctrine of promissory estoppel still leaves some
promises outside of the contract world. In addition, claiming promissory estoppel is an important doctrine does not mean it is flawless. It is
both an important doctrine and one that might be challenged.
Promissory estoppel’s justice element opens contract law to social
values and public policy considerations, such as balancing power dynamics and promoting distributive justice. This derives from the view
that parties and society are interrelated because every contract is formed
in a specific society. Society influences the contract and the contract is
influenced by society. Justice and reliance are open ended concepts and

202. For example, the decision states that “[i]t is a matter of common knowledge that it is
virtually impossible for a woman of that age to find satisfactory employment, much
less a position comparable to that which plaintiff enjoyed at the time of her retirement.” Feinberg, 322 S.W.2d at 169.
203. See supra notes 182-84.
204. For including emotions in contract law specifically and in law generally, see Hila Keren, Valuing Emotions, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 829 (2018); Hila Keren, Guilt-Free
Markets? Unconscionability, Conscience, and Emotions, 2016 BYU L. REV. 427 (2016);
Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Who’s Afraid of Law and the Emotions?, 94 MINN. L.
REV. 1997 (2010); Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Law in the Cultivation of Hope,
95 CALIF. L. REV. 319 (2007); Kathy Abrams & Hila Keren, Legal Hopes: Enhancing
Resilience Through the External Cultivation of Positive Emotions, 64 N. IR. LEGAL Q.
111 (2013).
205. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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applying them should include a contextual analysis of both the relationship between the parties and the social circumstances surrounding the
contract.
From a feminist economic standpoint, the gender dynamics between parties are crucial to understanding agreements. Specifically, the
social context of patriarchy, discrimination, and inequality is important
when women enter into contracts. Promissory estoppel incorporates this
context to the legal analysis of contracts by considering both intra-party
and inter-party relationships. Such context enhances contract law by
looking beyond the traditional economic market and thereby making
contract formation more flexible. Promissory estoppel thus expands
contract law’s boundaries and makes them more inclusive. As described
above, the value of promissory estoppel therefore rests in its ability to
supplement to the doctrine of consideration.
The above also shows the difference between mainstream economic
analysis and feminist economic analysis. Mainstream economics focuses
on market transactions: It is concerned with efficiency, assumes parties
206
are rational utility maximizers, and supports the status quo. On the
other hand, feminist economics focuses on family and other social settings: It looks at the social context (and primarily the gendered social
context) of the contract, assumes parties are motivated by love and care
as well as by personal gains, and seeks to promote gender equality and
redistribution. Feminist economics not only broadens economic analysis
(i.e., by providing a broader definition of well-being or utility) but also
constitutes a profound transformation of economic analysis itself. Feminist analysis enriches economics by challenging its male bias and opening economics to include women’s perspectives.
Other scholars have stressed the importance of promissory estoppel
207
for a variety of reasons, and on the basis of a number of theories. This
Article adds to this scholarship a fresh analysis from a feminist economic
perspective. In other words, the above feminist economic analysis joins
together with other theories and can be used to provide additional support to and evidence for the importance of promissory estoppel. Feminist economics has general applications to contract law beyond the doc208
trine of promissory estoppel, as elaborated in the next part.

206. See supra Part I.C.
207. See supra notes 43-59 and accompanying text.
208. See Lua Kamál Yuille, Toward a Heterodox Property Law and Economics, 2 TEX. A&M
L. REV. 489, 498 (2015) (containing a feminist economic analysis of property law);
Ann Laquer Estin, Can Families Be Efficient? A Feminist Appraisal, 4 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 1 (1996) (containing a feminist economic analysis of family law).
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IV. Feminist Economics Analysis of Contract Law
Feminist economics is a heterodox economic theory. Feminist eco209
nomics means more than just “add feminism and stir.” Rather, it fundamentally challenges the gendered foundations of mainstream econom210
ics. The combination of both economic theory and feminist theory
results in an integrated theory that is more powerful than the sum of its
parts. Feminist economics analysis enriches contract law, as the following demonstrates. The main features of feminist economics are relevant
to contract law more generally and are not limited to the doctrine of
promissory estoppel.
A. Other Contract Law Doctrines
The doctrine of promissory estoppel was provided in this Article as
one example, but the above insights are relevant to other doctrines as
well. For instance, interpretation of contract should take into account
the interconnectedness between the parties and society. This social con211
text is important for understanding the contract’s meaning. In other
words, feminist economics joins other scholarship in supporting contextual interpretation. Take for example the question of what the term
“sandwich” means in a given contract. Does it include a burrito? An answer to this question is not a matter of the dictionary definition of a
sandwich, but rather must stem from an engagement with cultural, eth212
nic, racial, and class aspects.
Another doctrine that is contextual is unconscionability. The fa213
mous case of Walker-Thomas illustrates the importance of gender,
class, and race when analyzing predatory business practices and the rela214
tionship between the parties and the contract. In Walker-Thomas the
209. See generally SANDRA HARDING, Just Add Women and Stir?, in MISSING LINKS:
GENDER EQUITY IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR DEVELOPMENT 296 (1995)
(adding women without substantive change is problematic).
210. Nelson, supra note 4.
211. See, e.g., CATHERINE MITCHELL, INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS 54 (2d ed. 2019)
(discussing contextual interpretation).
212. Marjorie Florestal, Is a Burrito a Sandwich? Exploring Race, Class, and Culture in Contracts, 14 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 57-59 (2008).
213. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
214. Anthony R. Chase, Race, Culture, and Contract Law: From the Cottonfield to the
Courtroom, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1, 63 (1995); Amy H. Kastely, Out of the Whiteness:
On Raced Codes and White Race Consciousness in Some Tort, Criminal, and Contract
Law, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 269, 305-10 (1994); Blake D. Morant, Law, Literature, and
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parties were a retail furniture store and a poor Black woman. According to its installment contract, Walker-Thomas retained title in all of
her furniture purchases until the total of all the monthly payments made
equaled the stated value of an item. In the event of a default in the payment of any monthly installment, Walker-Thomas could repossess the
item. The imbalance of power between the parties and the misuse of it
by Walker-Thomas is an important background to the court’s unconscionability analysis. This case demonstrates the predatory practices
faced by poor Black women. Feminist economics, then, exposes the
gendered economic aspects of the unconscionability doctrine.
Damages for breach of contract are also gendered. For example,
216
damages for a deformed nose as a result of plastic surgery were awarded within a context of gendered notions of beauty and looks. In Sullivan
v. O’Connor, the plaintiff, a professional entertainer, underwent an operation to shorten her nose. Afterwards, she sued, claiming the operation
217
had worsened her appearance. In its decision, the court described her
nose before and after the operation. It awarded her damages for pain
and suffering, mental distress, and worsening her conditions, even
though she did not show she suffered loss of employment. Thus the
damages award was intended to reflect the loss of her looks as a woman,
not the effect on her as a professional.
Unconscionability and good faith doctrines integrate into contract
law values other than efficiency. These doctrines highlight parties’ cooperation, interdependence, trust, and caring. They portray parties as more
than rational utility maximizers. Instead of a simplistic, narrow account
of the parties, these doctrines allow a richer, more complex and fuller
view of the parties. Also, these doctrines integrate into contract law so218
cial values and public policy. For example, these doctrines can battle
discrimination practices and promote equality. If parties are part of soci-

215.
216.
217.
218.

Contract: An Essay in Realism, 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 5-6 (1989); Blake D. Morant,
The Teachings of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and Contract Theory: An Intriguing
Comparison, 50 ALA. L. REV. 63, 108-09 (1998) [hereinafter Morant, The Teachings
of Dr. King]; see also Blake D. Morant, The Relevance of Race and Disparity in Discussions of Contract Law, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 889, 925-36 (1997); Muriel Morisey
Spence, Teaching Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 3 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 89, 98-99 (1994).
Walker-Thomas, 350 F.2d at 447.
Sullivan v. O’Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183 (Mass. 1973).
Sullivan, 296 N.E.2d at 184-85.
Hila Keren, “We Insist! Freedom Now”: Does Contract Doctrine Have Anything Constitutional to Say?, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 133, 179-83 (2005); Hila Keren, Law and
Economic Exploitation in an Anti-Classification Age, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 313, 36567 (2015).
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ety and contract is a social tool, then these values are important factors
of contract law. While mainstream law and economics explains these
doctrines on the basis of efficiency, feminist economics enriches this explanation beyond efficiency.
Social context is also important to the doctrines of duress and undue influence. Especially in the family context, the story behind these
legal claims is a story of patriarchy, power dynamics between women
and men, social norms, and gender roles. For example, threats made by
husbands against their wives while negotiating a prenuptial agreement
219
are based on social gender power structures. Another example is pressures husbands place upon their wives to sign as a surety for the hus220
band’s business debt. In a related vein, the doctrine of undue influence covers pressures resulting from discrimination against LGBTQ
221
individuals.
B. Core Values and Concepts
Feminist economics provides an alternative analysis to contract law.
It gives values such as cooperation, interdependence, relations, trust,
care, fairness, and justice central places in contract law, and goes well
beyond narrow concepts such as wealth maximization and efficiency. It
222
gives a fresh account of basic concepts like consent, freedom of con223
224
tract, and autonomy. These concepts should be reframed to include

219. Orit Gan, Contractual Duress and Relations of Power, 36 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 171,
209-10 (2013).
220. BELINDA FEHLBERG, SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DEBT: SURETY EXPERIENCE AND
ENGLISH LAW (1997); Rosemary Auchmuty, Men Behaving Badly: An Analysis of English Undue Influence Cases, 11 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 257, 265-66 (2002).
221. Odorizzi v. Bloomfield Sch. Dist., 54 Cal. Rptr. 533, 543 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966).
222. For contractual consent, see generally NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT
AND ITS LIMITS, 5-48 (2019) (discussing what it means to consent); see also Brian Bix,
Contracts, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 251 (Franklin G.
Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 2009) (exploring many of the issues relating to consent in contract law); Orit Gan, The Many Faces of Contractual Consent, 65 DRAKE L.
REV. 615, 618-26 (2017) (offering a model of consent); Chunlin Leonhard, The Unbearable Lightness of Consent in Contract Law, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 57, 70-73
(2012) (examining consent in contract law).
223. See Hila Keren, Undermining Justice: The Two Rises of Freedom of Contract and the
Fall of Equity, 2016 CAN. J. COMP. & CONTEMP. L. 339 (2016); see also Hila Keren,
In the Land of Choice: Privatized Reality and Contractual Vulnerability, in
PRIVATIZATION, VULNERABILITY, AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 60 (Martha Albertson Fineman, Ulrika Andersson & Titti Mattsson
eds., 2017).
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social norms and expectations. Parties’ choices and preferences cannot
be analyzed without taking into account social context, such as social
status, position, background, and circumstances. Specifically, gender
dynamics operating under a system of patriarchy constitute an important social context. Feminist economics, then, challenges the standard concept of consent, given that people are differently situated in society, have diverse opportunities and choices, and face unique limitations
and constraints to their agency and autonomy. Parties’ preferences are
not stable and fixed, but are rather the result of ever-changing social
norms and contexts. As I argue elsewhere:
Consent is not binary, but exists along a spectrum. In between full and free consent, on one end, and no consent, on
the other, lie hypothetical consent and implied consent, as
well as partial, questionable, and intermediate consent . . . .
Consent is nuanced and contextual and depends on circumstances; it varies in different types of contracts, and is in part
determined by the type of relationship between contracting
parties . . . . Consent is influenced not only by the relationships between the parties, but also by larger cultural and social context. Consent is socially situated: the consenting party’s position in society (gender, race, class) shapes his or her
225
consent.
Feminist insights on the variety of contractual relations, the different preferences and interests of parties, and the importance of care provide a more complex picture of the world of contract. Thus, one needs
to situate contracts in the social context of discrimination and inequality
and relations of class, race, and gender. Rather than a simplistic and reductive notion of consent, feminist economics provides complex and
nuanced concepts of freedom and autonomy. As Kathryn Abrams ex226
plains, autonomy is gendered.

224. See generally HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL HELLER, THE CHOICE THEORY OF
CONTRACTS 3 (2017).
225. Gan, supra note 222, at 660.
226. Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist Perspectives on Self-Direction, 40
WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 813-22 (1999).
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C. Non-Binary Thinking
Feminist economics critiques binary thinking and hierarchies in
contract law, such as those drawn between market and home. As
demonstrated, contract law is not limited to market transactions, as
people relate to one another in different forms and in different settings.
People interact with one another in communities and in families, not
only through the market. These are important relations to the parties
themselves, as well as to the economy. Therefore, contract law should
account for these agreements too. This not only reveals how the boundaries of contract law are set in a gendered way but also how contract law
could be more inclusive. Feminist economics refutes simplistic ideas
about parties and their motivations as solely rational utility maximizers.
It provides, instead, a more nuanced model of parties’ relations and
preferences and of the complex interaction between the self and society,
as well as that between the contract and the social background. Contract
law doctrines are not only procedural but also reflect and promote values such as justice, fairness, efficiency, autonomy. In other words, contract law goes beyond procedure to advance moral values. As discussed
above, promissory estoppel not only distinguishes enforceable promises
from unenforceable promises but also strengthens the right to contract.
It protects weaker promisees and mitigates power imbalances between
the parties in addition to the doctrine of formation of contract. Other
binaries that should be relaxed are those of objective-subjective, and of
227
form-substance. As will be further discussed in the next subpart, contract law is not simply private, but has social aspects as well.
Non-binary thinking in contract law is more nuanced and reflects
the complexity of contractual situations. Rather than black and white
dichotomies, contract law should include shades of gray. Furthermore,
binaries are oftentimes hierarchal in that they not only separate two options, but frequently situate one option as superior to the other. In other
words, not only do such binaries stress the difference between private
and public—or the market and the home—but also enable a preference
of the former over the latter. Such binaries establish an exclusionary
form of contract law. Rather than dichotomize between one (private) or
the other (public), it is critical to acknowledge that the two are interrelated in many subtle ways.

227. For binary thinking in contract law, see generally Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997, 1039-65, 1066-94 (1985).
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D. Social Aspects
Feminist economics highlights the interconnectedness of contract
and society and the interrelation between the private and the public.
According to feminist economics, parties are influenced by society and
228
their contracting is shaped by social context. The contract is shaped
by social norms, by the parties’ respective social statuses, and circumstances. Ignoring this background will necessarily limit the contract
analysis. In order to fully understand a contract, one needs to look at
the social context that exists beyond the specific language of the contract. Specifically, one needs to take into account gender roles, gender
229
stereotypes, and power dynamics. As Debora Threedy shows, the Ar230
thur Murray cases are based on gendered notions of widows. One also
needs to consider inequalities and discrimination on the basis of sex,
class and sexual orientation. Doing so would result in a fuller, more
complex analysis that goes beyond binaries. Contract law, although considered private law, has important social aspects. Feminist economics
231
supports contextual contract law.
Consent, a basic concept of contract law, is also socially constructed. As I have argued elsewhere:
Consent is undoubtedly connected to the will, choices, and
intentions of the parties, but it is also molded by public policy considerations that go beyond the parties’ interactions. As
such, consent is dynamic, its nature changing over time as
the result of broader social changes . . . . In this light, consent
must be viewed not only as a decision based on full information and reached without coercion, but also one which is
socially and culturally situated. Similarly, consent is not only
a matter of dynamics between contracting parties, but also a

228. See supra Part II.E.
229. See Threedy, Dancing Around Gender, supra note 2.
230. See id. at 761 (arguing that the Arthur Murray cases portray women litigants as vulnerable elderly widows in need of the paternalistic defense of the law).
231. For contextual contract law, see Daniel D. Barnhizer, Context as Power: Defining the
Field of Battle for Advantage in Contractual Interactions, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 607
(2010). See also Larry A. DiMatteo & Blake D. Morant, Contracts in Context and
Contracts as Context, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 549, 550-51 (2010); Morant, The
Teachings of Dr. King, supra note 214, at 70; Larry A. DiMatteo, Contract Stories: Importance of the Contextual Approach to Law, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1287 (2013). For legal
context generally, see Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1597 (1990).
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product of external societal circumstances, pressures, constraints, morals, norms, conventions, and understandings
that go beyond the parties’ own relationships . . . . Contract
law contains an inherent element of public considerations,
which clearly renders consent as a social construct with public dimensions greater than the scope of a personal decision
based on the contracting parties’ will and choices. Consent is
not only an individualistic process, formed in a vacuum between the contracting parties’ will, autonomy, interests, and
preferences. Consent is necessarily formed under social cir232
cumstances.
Consent is gendered and formed within the context of patriarchy.
E. Contracts Between Family Members
If the household is treated as a singular unit, it makes no sense to
talk about contracts between family members. However, feminist economics views the household as a group of individuals with different interests and preferences that might sometimes conflict. Therefore, contract law should include intra-family contracts. This opens contract law
to more nuanced relations, and more agreements. It stretches contract
law beyond the market and beyond pure commercial or economic
agreements. More people will benefit from contract law; more relations
233
will be covered by contract law. Conflicts in the family might be resolved using contracts. And at the same time, incorporating family values can influence contract law. Both institutions might benefit from the
existence of intra-family contracts. Contract law should not be limited
to commercial agreements. As Hanoch Dagan explains, “spousal contracts operate, of course, in a different contract sphere than commercial
ones, but they perform a similar empowering service, and are thus no
234
less (or more) central to the idea of contract in law.” Furthermore,

232. Gan, supra note 222, at 652.
233. See Neil G. Williams, What to Do When There’s No “I Do”: A Model for Answering
Damages Under Promissory Estoppel, 70 WASH. L. REV. 1019, 1043 (1995) (arguing
that promissory estoppel should be used to award damages for breach of promise to
marry); see generally Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The Legality of Contracts Governing the Disposition of Embryos: Unenforceable Intra-Family Agreements, 43 SW. L. REV. 191
(2013).
234. Hanoch Dagan, Intimate Contracts and Choice Theory, 7 EUROPEAN CONT. L. &
THEORY 1 (forthcoming 2021).

2021]

A FEMINIST ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE ON CONTRACT LAW

47

235

contract law will enable a plurality of family arrangements. Each family will be able to use contract law in order to shape the family setting as
they see fit. Rather than one standard for all families, each family will
choose the relational model that best suits them.
There are arguments against applying contract law in the family
setting. Family relations are unique, it could be argued, and thus cannot
be thought of in contractual terms. Others could claim that family is
about relations of love and not about economic relations. Furthermore,
it might be posited that the involvement of economic values could harm
family members. Commodification concerns and concerns regarding the
reduction of intra-family relations to an economic exchange are not only
frequently inaccurate, but may, in fact, result in injustice. This is not to
say such critique is not valuable, nor that commodification isn’t a genuine concern. However, it is clear that contract law can be stretched to
include intra-family contracts, while still safeguarding against aliena236
tion. Feminist economics will make contract law more relational and
strengthen the trust, cooperation, and interdependence between the parties. Contract law applied to intra-family agreement is not rigid and
formalistic, entailing a focus on efficiency only, but rather is a version of
237
contract law that connects parties to each other.
Take, for example, the hypothetical issue of baby selling. Landes
and Posner proposed a market for babies based on a mainstream eco-

235. See generally Erez Aloni, The Puzzle of Family Law Pluralism, 39 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 317 (2016).
236. For contract law’s alienation, see generally Robert Batey, Alienation by Contract in
Paris Trout, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 289 (1994).
237. There is rich literature addressing contracts between family members. See MARTHA
M. ERTMAN, LOVE’S PROMISES: HOW FORMAL AND INFORMAL CONTRACTS SHAPE
ALL KINDS OF FAMILIES (2015); YEHEZKEL MARGALIT, THE JEWISH FAMILY:
BETWEEN FAMILY LAW AND CONTRACT LAW (2018); YEHEZKEL MARGALIT,
DETERMINING LEGAL PARENTAGE: BETWEEN FAMILY LAW AND CONTRACT LAW 10
(2019); Mary Anne Case, Enforcing Bargains in an Ongoing Marriage, 35 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 225, 225-27 (2011); Martha M. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage: A
Proposal for Valuing Women’s Work Through Premarital Security Agreements, 77 TEX.
L. REV. 17, 37-54 (1998); Virginia Held, Non-Contractual Society: A Feminist View,
13 CAN. J. PHIL. 111, 136-137 (1987); Hila Keren, Can Separate Be Equal: Intimate
Economic Exchange and the Cost of Being Special, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 19, 25-26
(2005); Robert A. Pollak, Commentary, Comment on Mary Anne Case’s Enforcing
Bargains in an Ongoing Marriage, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 261, 261-262 (2011);
Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV.
1225, 1231 (1998); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, The Gendered Curriculum: Of Contracts
and Careers, 77 IOWA L. REV. 55, 58-60 (1991).
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nomic analysis. Their analysis uses supply and demand, and the costs
239
and benefits considerations of such market. However, feminist economics would take into account the values of caring for children, their
humanity, commodification concerns, the parents-children relations and
the social harms to society, as well as the racial and class aspects of such
240
a market regime.
More broadly, Richard Posner, for example, assumes preferences,
rational choice, and a free market in his economic analysis of sexuali241
ty. Feminist economics, on the other hand, places sexuality within a
larger social context, such as that of power dynamics between men and
242
women. As these examples demonstrate, feminist economics is not a
rigid application of economic principles, but rather is an economics
aware of social concerns, including commodification and other moral
public policy and fairness concerns. Feminist economics goes beyond
rationality and efficiency and is sensitive to feminist and other social
considerations. Thus, applying feminist economics analysis to the family
does not raise genuine concerns of alienation and commodification as
would the application of mainstream economics to the same sphere.
As shown by Borelli, decisions regarding what promises to enforce
are gendered. In other words, setting the boundaries of contract law is
not gender neutral. The decision to leave family outside contract law’s
reach results in distributive injustice. It has devastating economic consequences for women, often leaving them without the promised exchange
or other recourse. Recall that in Borelli the husband’s promise was not
243
enforced and the wife did not get the property that he promised her.
Women’s inability to use contract law to further their economic interests hurts them financially. Women’s poverty is an important concern.
Contracts with family members can provide women with some financial
support. In the past, women could not own property or contract at all,
244
thus leaving them dependent on their fathers or husbands. Furthermore, applying contract law in the family setting does not mean that

238. Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978).
239. Id. at 329.
240. For a critique of baby selling, see Margaret Jane Radin, Market Inalienability, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1925-28 (1987).
241. POSNER, supra note 91; see also BECKER, supra note 91.
242. For a feminist critique of Posner, see Robin West, Sex, Reason, and a Taste for the Absurd, 81 GEO.L.J. 2413 (1993). See also Ann Laquer Estin, Love and Obligation: Family Law and the Romance of Economics, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 989 (1995).
243. Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 20 (1993).
244. See Chused, supra note 138, at 48-49.

2021]

A FEMINIST ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE ON CONTRACT LAW

49

everything in the family is a matter of contract. Some things are outside
the realm of contract law. For example, baby selling is prohibited for
245
commodification reasons. At the same time, applying contract law in
the family setting includes applying doctrines that protect vulnerable
246
family members (usually women), such as unconscionability and good
247
faith. These contract doctrines ensure that family values and family
members are not hurt by rigid contract law, but rather that contract law
applied in the family sphere is relational, flexible, just, fair, protectionist,
and contextual.
All of the above makes contract law broader and more inclusive. It
goes beyond the market and efficiency to incorporate diverse relations,
interests, and preferences. It promotes a variety of values and includes a
wide range of different parties. It is sensitive to commodification, alienation, inequality, and discrimination. In other words, feminist economics
does not only enrich the literature of promissory estoppel but contract
law scholarship in general, as well.
Feminist economics joins other theories in stressing the aforementioned insights. It is not the only theory to challenge formal liberal contract law; relational theory of contract and other critical theories such as
feminist theory and critical race theory do so as well. For example, Ian
R. MacNeil has criticized the individualistic nature of classic contract
248
law and pointed to the relational and social aspects of contract law.
However, MacNeil failed to account for power dynamics between men
and women. Feminist economics’ use of both economics and feminist
insights provides a new perspective on contract law. In other words,
feminist economics is an important theoretical tool with which to analyze contract law, even if some of its conclusions echo those of other
theories. Furthermore, as demonstrated above, feminist economics enriches contract law, making it more inclusive, pluralistic, contextual,
egalitarian, and just. Since economic analysis of contract law is immensely important, it is critical to integrate feminist insights into its
core. As economics scholar Susan Himmelweit concludes, “feminist

245. Another example of commodification in family law is the practice of women offering
money to their husbands in exchange for a gett (Jewish decree of divorce) that the
husband would otherwise refuse to agree to. See Orit Gan, Trading the Gett: Between
Contractual Right and Inalienability, 32 BAR ILAN L. STUD. 797 (2020) (Isr.).
246. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 208 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
247. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 205 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
248. For relational theory, see, for example, IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL
CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980); see also
THE RELATIONAL THEORY OF CONTRACT: SELECTED WORKS OF IAN MACNEIL (David Campbell ed., 2001).
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economics is not just another school of economics—and certainly not as
249
economics just for women—but is simply better economics.” Therefore, feminist economics provides a better theoretical analysis of contract
law.
Conclusion
Economic analysis is a highly influential theoretical approach to
contract law. At the same time, feminist analysis of contract law offers
an important critical approach to the field. However, feminist economics has only been applied scarcely and sporadically to contract law. This
Article seeks to bridge this gap, and to apply the key features of feminist
economics to an analysis of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. This
Article uses promissory estoppel as an example to demonstrate a feminist
economic analysis of contract law. This Article enriches the diverse literature of promissory estoppel by adding to it a feminist economic perspective. Based on analyses put forward by feminist economics, this Article joins other scholarship in exploring the importance and significance
of this doctrine. Specifically, it enriches the economic analysis of promissory estoppel, and it adds to the literature concerning the relation between the doctrine of consideration and the doctrine of promissory estoppel, arguing that the latter is a valuable and important supplement to
the former. This Article concludes by arguing that feminist economics is
applicable to contract law generally. Feminist economics is a valuable
theory—relevant not only to promissory estoppel but to other doctrines,
core concepts, and values at the heart of contract law.
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